

# REBECA

## (Research on Social Benefits in Collective Agreements)

### **Database Codebook**

#### **Part 1: Actors and Institutions**

Completed within the context of Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF)  
No. 100012-119898: The Privatization of Welfare States: Industrial  
Relations as a Source of Social Benefits

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## Summary of Data

The REBECA (Research on Social Benefits in Collective Agreements) database is the product of a two-year research project (September 2008 to September 2010), "The Privatization of Welfare States, Collective Agreements as a Source of Social Benefits" (100012-119898), financed by the Swiss National Fund for Science (SNF) and located at the Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. The project is lead by Christine Trampusch. The database is available online at: [www.rebeca.ipw.unibe.ch](http://www.rebeca.ipw.unibe.ch).

The database is divided into two parts: Part 1 *Actors and Institutions* contains historical and current data on trade unions, employers' associations, the state and industrial relations. Part 1 contains information on 16 Western European countries. Part 2 *Collectively Negotiated Social Benefits*, which will be published in 2010, will contain data on social benefits regulated and financed by collective agreements between trade unions and employers in the domains of old age and skills. Part 2 contains information on 10 Western European countries.

The first part, *Actors and Institutions*, describes the institutional context within which collectively negotiated benefits evolve and develop. It comprises historical as well as current data on the development of trade unions, employers' associations, industrial relations and the state. The database is divided into four main chapters: 1) "Political Integration" 2) "Industrial Integration" 3) "Industrial Relations, Coordination and Corporatism", and 4) "The State". The chapters on "Political Integration" and "Industrial Integration" are mainly historical and contain data on the formation of trade unions, employers, industrial relations and on union run welfare schemes. The chapter on "Industrial Relations, Coordination and Corporatism" contains data on the structure and procedures of collective bargaining, coordination and corporatism. The chapter on "The State" contains data on political institutions, the role of the state in collective bargaining and the introduction of public welfare schemes.

The universe of data in *Actors and Institutions* includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

This codebook contains the following information for every variable: four digit number, name, definition, operationalization, time period/year, sources and footnotes.

The possibilities for operationalization of the variables are: description, definition, year, abbreviation, name, number, classification, percentage, index and yes/no-dichotomy.

The possibilities for time period/year of the variables are: year of introduction, year of foundation or year (e.g. 1990); time series (which means data is given for every year); time period (which means only one classification or score is given for the whole time period, when possible it is given whether the one score is the average of the period or the most recent score); and in the case that the time period/year of the data is not given or is unclear: "Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source."

Missing data is not explicitly listed. For every variable the included countries are listed after their respective source. Even though a country is listed does not imply that all data for this variable is available, for example some years are missing for certain countries in time series data. Such missing data is recognizable by an empty space in the data sheet.

## Citation Information

In any work using data from this data set, please quote both the data set, and where appropriate, the original source.

## Data Disclaimer

The original collector of the data, REBECA and the SNF bear no responsibility for uses of this collection, or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses.

## Acknowledgements

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## Data Format

Online database and downloadable comma separated values (CSV).

## Abbreviations

Countries are abbreviated according to the ISO (International Organization for Standardization) two-digit code (ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and Switzerland (CH)

Other abbreviations: Circa (c.)

## Related Publications (most recent)

- Trampusch, Christine (2010): The Welfare State and Trade Unions in Switzerland. An Historical Reconstruction of the Shift from a Liberal to a Post-Liberal Welfare Regime. In: *Journal of European Social Policy*, forthcoming.
- Trampusch, Christine (2009): Collective Agreements on Pensions as a Source of Solidarity. In: *Journal of Comparative Social Welfare* 25(2), 129--137.
- Trampusch, Christine (2009): Religion, Parteien und Industrielle Beziehungen. Die Entstehung der Arbeitslosenversicherung in den Niederlanden. In: *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform* 55(3), forthcoming.
- Trampusch, Christine (2008): Von einem liberalen zu einem post-liberalen Wohlfahrtsstaat. Der Wandel der gewerkschaftlichen Sozialpolitik in der Schweiz. In: *Swiss Political Science Review* 14(1), 49--84.
- Trampusch, Christine (2008): Warum und wie Industrielle Beziehungen den Parteeffekt auf wohlfahrtsstaatliche Retrenchmentpolitik beeinflussen. Ein Vergleich zwischen den Niederlanden, Dänemark, Deutschland und Frankreich. In: *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 2(1), 52--77.

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# 1 Political Integration

## 1.1 Introduction of Political Rights

### 1.1.1 *Freedom of Association and Parliamentarism*

#### 1.1.1.1 Introduction of Freedom of Association

Definition: Year of introduction of freedom of association.  
Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995:61): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Armingeon (1994: 34-68, 170-220): PT, DK, DE, FI.  
Footnotes:

#### 1.1.1.2 Introduction of Suffrage for 50% of Male Population

Definition: Year when suffrage for at least 50% of men was introduced.  
Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995:61): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### 1.1.1.3 Introduction of Universal Male Suffrage

Definition: Year when universal suffrage for men was introduced.  
Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Armingeon (1994:81): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### 1.1.1.4 Introduction of Parliamentarism

Definition: Year when parliamentarism as a system of government was first introduced: "Year when cabinet responsibility towards the parliament was introduced" (Ebbinghaus 199: 61).  
Please note that in several countries the system of government has changed in the meantime.  
Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 61): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### 1.1.1.5 Introduction of Proportional Representation

Definition: Year of first introduction of proportional representation.  
Please note that this variable does not imply that a proportional representation system still exists.  
Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 61): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Flora et al. (1983: 108): FI.  
Footnotes:

#### 1.1.1.6 Voter Turnout for Coalition Right Enactment

Definition: Voter turnout in the year in which the coalition right was legally enacted (tolerated and completely institutionalized) as percentage of the voting population.  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Year of coalition right enactment  
Sources: Armingeon (1994: 81): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## 1.2 Party-Union Relationship

### 1.2.1 Foundation of Parties with an Allied Union

#### 1.2.1.1 First National Workers Party

Definition: Year when first national workers party was founded.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.

Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of introduction

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 83): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### 1.2.1.2 First Workers Party in Parliament

Definition: Year when workers party was first elected to parliament.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the Author.

Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of introduction

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 83): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### 1.2.1.3 Foundation of Socialist Parties and Allied Unions

Definition: Dates of foundation and name of socialist parties and allied union movements.  
This data applies to historical parties and unions as well as recent parties and unions.

Operationalization: Year and name

Time Period/Year: Year of foundation

Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 71); Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41 and Table 2 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: Names and Years are taken out of Ebbinghaus (1995: 71) and Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41). Further information is taken from table 2 for every country in Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000).  
DE: Recent and Historical Union: The sources Ebbinghaus (1995: 71) and Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41) are not concordant with Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 279-337). The foundation year of the DGB is taken from Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 307).

#### 1.2.1.4 Foundation of Catholic Parties and Allied Unions

Definition: Dates of foundation and name of catholic (democratic) parties and allied union movements.  
This data applies to historical parties and unions as well as recent parties and unions.

Operationalization: Year and name

Time Period/Year: Year of foundation

Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 71); Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41 and Table 2 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: Names and Years are taken out of Ebbinghaus (1995: 77) and Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41). Further information is taken from table 2 for every country in Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000).  
FR: Recent Union Name: In Ebbinghaus (1995: 77) the union's name is CFDT. But Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 237-277) explains that the CFDT is a secularized successor to the CFTC, while the catholic successor to the CFTC is called CFTC-maintenu.  
NL: Source of Recent Party Name (Foundation of CDA 1977): Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 433).

#### 1.2.1.5 Foundation of Protestant Parties and Allied Unions

Definition: Dates of foundation and name of protestant (democratic) parties and allied union movements.  
This data applies to historical parties and unions as well as recent parties and unions.

Operationalization: Year and name

Time Period/Year: Year of foundation  
 Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 71); Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41 and Table 2 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: Names and Years are taken out of Ebbinghaus (1995: 77) and Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41). Further information is taken from table 2 for every country in Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000).  
 NL: Source of Recent Party Name (Foundation of CDA 1977): Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 433).

### 1.2.1.6 Foundation of Communist Parties and Allied Unions

Definition: Dates of foundation and name of communist parties and allied union movements.  
 This data applies to historical parties and unions as well as recent parties and unions.  
 Operationalization: Year and name  
 Time Period/Year: Year of foundation  
 Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 71); Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41 and Table 2 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: Names and Years are taken from Ebbinghaus (1995: 80) and Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41). Further information is taken from table 2 for every country in Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000).  
 AT: Source of Recent Union Name/Year: Gewerkschaftlicher Linksblock im ÖGB (2006).  
 FR: Recent Union Year: According to Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 237-277) the CGT was both a communist and a socialist movement until 1947. Therefore, the same year is taken as for the socialist CGT, even though this is not concordant with the years mentioned in Ebbinghaus (1995: 80) and Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 41).  
 DE: Source of Recent Party Name (Date of ban and reformation of DKP): Mackie/Rose (1974: 144-145).  
 DE: Source of Recent Party Name 2 and Year 2: Die Linke (2008).  
 IT: Source of Recent Party Name and Year: Armingeon et al. (2008).  
 IT: Source of disbandment date of historical party: Armingeon et al. (2008).  
 NL: Source of Recent Party Name and Year: Mackie/Rose (1947: 269).  
 PT: Source of recent party name: Armingeon et al. (2008).  
 SE: Source of Recent Party renaming in 1967: Mackie/Rose (1974: 343).  
 CH: Source of Recent Party Name: Mackie/Rose (1974:365).

## 1.2.2 Percentage of Votes for Parties with an Allied Union

### 1.2.2.1 Percentage of Votes for Socialist Party with an Allied Union

Definition: Votes in percentage in national elections for socialist party that has an allied union. The foundation and name of such a party is listed above in Variable 1.1.2.3: Foundation of Socialist Parties and Allied Unions.  
 Data is entered as it was available in sources; therefore, it is possible that the parties already participated in earlier elections than are described here. If there were two or more elections in one year, only the results of the last election are given.  
 Please note for data from 1960-2006 that the data is only entered if the party reached at least 2% of the vote share in an election.  
 Please note that GR and LU are not included because they are already missing in Variable 1.1.2.3).  
 Operationalization: Percentage  
 Time Period/Year: First available election data until 2006: AT: 1907, BE: 1890, DK: 1901, FI: 1907, FR: 1906, DE: 1871, IE: 1922, IT: 1895, NL: 1894, NO: 1894, SE: 1902 and CH: 1896.  
 Sources: First available election data until 1959: Mackie/Rose (1974): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
 1960-2006: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: AT: 1907 and 1911: election results of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
 BE: The Socialist Party was split in 1977 in two parties: Social Progressive Alternative/SPIRIT (SP.a/SPIRIT) (until 2001: Flemish Socialist Party (SP)) and Francophone Socialist Party (PS). The percentage of votes after 1977 is the sum of both parties.

FR: 1924: Together with Radical Socialist Party and Socialist Republicans.  
 GR: Data exists only for years after 1960 in Armingeon et al. (2008) and is missing in Mackie/Rose (1974).  
 IE: 1944: Together with National Labour.  
 IT: 1948: Sum of PSI, PSDI and Communist Party.  
 1953 - 1993: Sum of PSI and PSDI (1968: both parties reunited for one election).  
 PT: Data only available after 1960 (first free election in 1975) in Armingeon et al. (2008), missing in Mackie/Rose (1974).  
 ES: Data only available after 1960 (first free election in 1977) in Armingeon et al. (2008), missing in Mackie/Rose (1974).

### 1.2.2.2 Percentage of Votes for Catholic Party with an Allied Union

**Definition:** Votes in percentage in national elections for catholic party that has an allied union. The foundation and name of such a party is listed above in Variable 1.1.2.4: Foundation of Catholic Parties and Allied Unions.  
 Data is entered as it was available in sources; therefore, it is possible that the parties already participated in earlier elections than are described here. If there were two or more elections in one year, only the results of the last election are given.  
 Please note for data from 1960-2006 that the data is only entered if the party reached at least 2% of the vote share in an election.  
 Please note that GR and LU are not included because they are already missing in Variable 1.1.2.4).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** First available election data until 2006: AT: 1907, BE: 1847, FR: 1932, DE: 1871, IT: 1919, NL: 1888 and CH: 1896.

**Sources:** First available election data until 1959: Mackie/Rose (1974): AT, BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, CH.  
 1960-2006: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, CH.

**Footnotes:** AUS: 1907 and 1911: election results of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
 BE: Inconsistency with Variable 1.1.2.4: According to the sources of Variable 1.1.2.4 the catholic party was founded in 1884. But in Mackie/Rose (1974) there is election data for the same catholic party since 1847.  
 FR: 1936: Together with Conservative, Liberal Popular Action, Left Republicans, Independent Radicals and Republican Union.  
 DE: 1949: 31.0% for Christian Democratic Union and 3.1% for Centre Party. 1953: 45.2% for Christian Democratic Union and 0.8% for Centre Party.  
 NL: Inconsistency with Variable 1.1.2.4: According to the sources of Variable 1.1.2.4 the catholic party was founded in 1897. But in Mackie/Rose (1974) there is data about election results since 1888. Since 1977: Results for CDA (Merger of Catholic and Protestant parties).

### 1.2.2.3 Percentage of Votes for Protestant Party with an Allied Union

**Definition:** Votes in percentage in national elections for protestant party that has an allied union. The foundation and name of such a party is listed above in Variable 1.1.2.5: Foundation of Protestant Parties and Allied Unions.  
 Data is entered as it was available in sources; therefore, it is possible that the parties already participated in earlier elections than are described here. If there were two or more elections in one year, only the results of the last election are given.  
 Please note for data from 1960-2006 that the data is only entered if the party reached at least 2% of the vote share in an election.  
 Please note that GR and LU are not included because they are already missing in Variable 1.1.2.5).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** First available election data until 2006: DK: 1971, NL: 1888, NO: 1933 and CH: 1919.

**Sources:** First available election data until 1959: Mackie/Rose (1974): NL, NO, CH.  
 1960-2006: Armingeon et al. (2008): DK, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:** NL: 1894 - 1977: Added value of CHU (until 1908: CHK) and ARP. Since 1977: Results for CDA (Merger of Catholic and Protestant parties).

#### 1.2.2.4 Percentage of Votes for Communist Party with an Allied Union

Definition:	<p>Votes in percentage in national elections for communist party that has an allied union. The foundation and name of such a party is listed above in Variable 1.1.2.6: Foundation of Communist Parties and Allied Unions.</p> <p>Data is entered as it was available in sources; therefore, it is possible that the parties already participated in earlier elections than are described here. If there were two or more elections in one year, only the results of the last election are given.</p> <p>Please note for data from 1960-2006 that the data is only entered if the party reached at least 2% of the vote share in an election.</p> <p>Please note that GR and LU are not included because they are already missing in Variable 1.1.2.6).</p>
Operationalization:	Percentage
Time Period/Year:	First available election data until 2006: AT: 1920, BE: 1921, DK: 1920, FI: 1945, FR: 1925, DE: 1920, IT: 1921, NL: 1918, NO: 1924, SE: 1921 and CH: 1922.
Sources:	First available election data until 1959: Mackie/Rose (1974): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	1960-2006: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH. FI: 1945-1986: SKDL, 1987-1990: Sum of SKDL and DEVA, and since 1991: Leftist Alliance. DE: 1920-1956: KPD. 1968-1990: no data for DKP in Armingeon et al. (2008). 1990-2007: PDS, PDS and WASG (2005). Since 2007: Die Linke. IT: 1948: Sum of PCI and PSI. 1992: PRC PT: Data only available after 1960 (first free election in 1975) in Armingeon et al. (2008), missing in Mackie/Rose (1974). 1976, 1979, 1980: Electoral Alliance of Democratic Movement and Communist Party. 1983, 1985: Electoral Alliance of Democratic Movement, Communist Party and Greens. ES: Data only available after 1960 (first free election in 1977) in Armingeon et al. (2008), missing in Mackie/Rose (1974). Armingeon et al. (2008) only has data of all Communist parties together: PCE, PSUC and IU.

#### 1.2.2.5 Sequencing of Party and Union Formation

Definition:	<p>Classification of the sequencing of party and union formation.</p> <p>Four different types:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>Social-Democratic: "In these countries, a well-organized Socialist party [...] initially coordinated the local and national activities of unions. The party later initiated the founding of an allied union 'secretariat', from which a fully fledged centralized union confederation emerged" (Ebbinghaus 1995: 72).</li><li>Labor Party: "The union movement became entrenched before a Socialist party could exert a centralizing influence" (Ebbinghaus 1995: 73).</li><li>Late-Comer: "The party preceded the unions, but was not sufficiently centralized to push union movement toward centralization [...]. This pattern represents incomplete forms of party-led union centralization due to organization problems under late industrialization and incomplete national integration" (Ebbinghaus 1995: 74).</li><li>Peripheral: "Both party and unions developed independently, overlapping in activities and competing over working class alliances" (Ebbinghaus: 1995: 74).</li></ol>
Operationalization:	Classification
Time Period/Year:	Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.
Sources:	Ebbinghaus (1995: 72-75): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	

#### 1.2.2.6 Political Relationship between Parties and Unions

Definition:	<p>Classification of the relationship between trade unions and political parties, and the political arena as a whole, "by two structural dimensions that evolved in the course of nation-building and state formation in the nineteenth and twentieth century" (Streeck/Hassel 2003: 342).</p>
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The two dimensions:

- Political unity between trade unions and parties: Fragmented vs. unified.
- Politicization of trade unions: Non-political vs. Politicized.

Five different types:

- a) Polarized: Fragmented and highly politicized.
- b) Segmented: Fragmented and politicized.
- c) Social-democratic: Unified and highly politicized.
- d) Unified: Unified and somewhat politicized.
- e) Laborist: Unified and non-political.

Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: The nineteenth and twentieth century according to Streeck/Hassel (2003: 342).  
Sources: Streeck/Hassel (2003: 343): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## 2 Industrial Integration

### 2.1 Introduction of Coalition Right, Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining and Works Councils

#### 2.1.1 *Introduction of Coalition Right*

##### 2.1.1.1 **Ban on Coalition Building**

Definition: Year that a ban on coalition building (trade unions) was secured (prior to introduction of coalition right).

Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of ban on coalition building

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 175-220): BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

##### 2.1.1.2 **Toleration of Coalition Building**

Definition: Year of the first toleration (restricted institutionalization) of the coalition right.

Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of toleration of coalition building

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 75): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

##### 2.1.1.3 **Institutionalization of Coalition Right**

Definition: Year when the coalition right was first secured in the constitution.

Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of institutionalization of the coalition right

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 75): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

##### 2.1.1.4 **State of the Economy**

Definition: The state of the economy (percent of the total employment in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> sector) at the time of the first institutionalization of toleration of coalition building (see Variable 2.1.1.2: Toleration of Coalition Building). Percent of employed, who are employed in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> sector.

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: Year of toleration of coalition building

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 78): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: NO: The data comes from a census from 1865; therefore the level of industrialization listed is probably higher than it actually was in 1839.  
CH: The data comes from 1880; therefore the level of industrialization listed is probably higher than it actually was in 1848.

### **2.1.1.5 Strength of Political Opposition**

**Definition:** The strength of opposition against the introduction of the coalition right, based upon the amount of not-socialist political parties in the parliament and the relationship between unions and the parliament. The strength was measured immediately before the institutionalization of the coalition right (see Variable 2.1.1.3: Institutionalization of Coalition Right).  
Index from 1-4 developed by Armingeon (1994: 88):  
1= Strong  
4= Weak

**Operationalization:** Index 1-4

**Time Period/Year:** Year of institutionalization of the coalition right

**Sources:** Armingeon (1994: 88): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

### **2.1.1.6 Political Environment**

**Definition:** Historical context at the time of the institutionalization of the coalition right (see Variable 2.1.1.3: Institutionalization of Coalition Right).  
Four different types:  
a) Peaceful and Early: Peaceful and early institutionalization of the coalition right, result of lack of ban on coalition building or lack of enforcement of the ban.  
b) Conflictual Domestic Politics Reform Process: Result of along domestic politics reform process and a breakthrough in power constellations or political options.  
c) External Shocks: Result of external shocks such as war, defeat or political upheaval due to war.  
d) Late: Delayed institutionalization due to authoritarian rule.

**Operationalization:** Classification

**Time Period/Year:** Year of institutionalization of the coalition right

**Sources:** Armingeon (1994: 33-68): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

## **2.1.2 Introduction of Trade Unions**

### **2.1.2.1 First National Trade Union**

**Definition:** Year the first national trade union was founded, its full name and its branch.

**Operationalization:** Year, name and branch

**Time Period/Year:** Year of foundation

**Sources:** Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Country summary and Table 2 for every country): AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

### **2.1.2.2 First Peak Trade Organization**

**Definition:** Year the first peak trade organization was founded and its full name.

**Operationalization:** Year and name

**Time Period/Year:** Year of foundation

**Sources:** Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Country summary and Table 2 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

### **2.1.2.3 Introduction of Strike Right**

**Definition:** Year of institutionalization of the right to strike.

**Operationalization:** Year

**Time Period/Year:** Year of institutionalization

**Sources:** Armingeon (1994: 34-68 and 175-220): BE, FR, GR, IT, NL, PT, ES, CH.  
Ebbinghaus (1995: 61, 63 and Appendix): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**



### **2.1.3 Introduction of Collective Bargaining**

#### **2.1.3.1 First Major Collective Bargaining Agreement**

Definition: Year of the first major/national collective bargaining/labor agreement, as well as the name of the agreement and a short description of the introduction of the agreement.

Operationalization: Year, name and description

Time Period/Year: Year of agreement

Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: Appendix): BE, DK, FR, DE, NO, SE, CH.  
Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 1): FI, IE, IT, NL, NO.  
Armingeon (1994: 35): IT.  
Nystrom (2005: 2-3): SE.  
Nielsen (2005: 4): DK.

Footnotes:

#### **2.1.3.2 Number of Collective Agreements in Force in 1928**

Definition: Number of collective agreements in force at the end of the year in 1928.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: 1928

Sources: ILO (1936: 208): AT, DE, NL, NO, SE.

Footnotes: DE: Agreements in force on 1 January, not at end of year.

NL: Agreements in force on 1 June, not at end of year.

#### **2.1.3.3 Number of Workers Covered by Collective Agreements in 1928**

Definition: Number of workers covered by collective agreements in 1928.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: 1928

Sources: ILO (1936: 208): AT, DE, NL, NO, SE.

Footnotes:

#### **2.1.3.4 Introduction of Legal Regulation of Collective Bargaining**

Definition: Year of the introduction of legal regulation of collective bargaining, as well as the name of the law and a short description of the introduction.

Operationalization: Year, name and description

Time Period/Year: Year of Introduction

Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: Appendix): FR, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Armingeon (1994: 175-220): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, GR, IT, PT, ES.

Footnotes:

#### **2.1.3.5 Introduction of Arbitration Law and/or Process**

Definition: Year of introduction of arbitration law or process, or the first major arbitration, as well as the name of the law and a short description of the introduction.

Operationalization: Year, name and description

Time Period/Year: Year of Introduction

Sources: Armingeon (1994: 34-68 and 175-220): AT, DK, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Ebbinghaus (1995: Appendix): DE.

Footnotes:

### **2.1.4 Introduction of Works Councils and Co-determination**

#### **2.1.4.1 Introduction of Statutory Works Councils**

Definition: Introduction of statutory works councils or national labor conference as a “threshold(s) for political and industrial integration” Ebbinghaus (1995: 61).  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.

Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of introduction

Sources: Ebbinghaus (1995: 61): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **2.1.4.2 Introduction of Works Councils**

Definition: Year of the introduction of works councils, as well as the name of the law and a short description of the introduction.  
Streeck defines this as the first date of major legislation on workplace representation.

Operationalization: Year, name and description

Time Period/Year: Year of introduction

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 1): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, NL, NO, PT, ES.  
Streek (1995: 326): IT, SE.

Footnotes:

#### **2.1.4.3 Introduction of Co-determination**

Definition: Year of the introduction of co-determination, as well as the name of the law and a short description of the introduction.

Operationalization: Year, name and description

Time Period/Year: Year of introduction

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 1): DK, FI, DE, IT, NO, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **2.2 Economic Coordination c. 1900**

### **2.2.1 Guilds and Cooperatives**

#### **2.2.1.1 Guild Tradition and Strong Local Economies**

Definition: Was there a guild tradition and a strong local economy in c. 1900? This dimension is understood to be a “precursor for well-organized producer groups” Cusack et al. (2007: 385).

Operationalization: Yes/No

Time Period/Year: c. 1900

Sources: Cusack et al. (2007: 385): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **2.2.1.2 Widespread Rural Cooperatives**

Definition: Were there widespread rural cooperatives in c. 1900? This dimension is understood to be an “indicator of close ties between agriculture, industry, and long-term credit institutions” (Cusack et al. 2007: 385).

Operationalization: Yes/No

Time Period/Year: c. 1900

Sources: Cusack et al. (2007, 385): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **2.2.2 Employers and Unions**

#### **2.2.2.1 High Employer Coordination**

Definition: Was there high employer coordination in c. 1900? This dimension is understood to be an “indicator of the capacity of employers to pursue their collective interests, especially in the industrial relations system” (Cusack et al. 2007: 385).

Operationalization: Yes/No

Time Period/Year: c. 1900

Sources: Cusack et al. (2007: 385): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **2.2.2.2 Industry/Centralized vs. Craft/Fragmented Unions**

Definition: Were there industry-based or nationally centralized unions as opposed to craft or fragmented unions in c. 1900? This dimension is understood to be an “indicator of capacity and proclivity of unions to engage employers in a cooperative industrial relations system” (Cusack et al. 2007: 385).

Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: c. 1900  
Sources: Cusack et al. (2007: 385): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **2.2.2.3 Large Skill-Based Export Sector**

Definition: Was there a large skill-based export sector in c. 1900? This dimension is understood to be an “indicator of the necessity for compromises over wages and training” (Cusack et al. 2007: 385).

Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: c. 1900  
Sources: Cusack et al. (2007: 385): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **2.2.2.4 Index of Economic Coordination**

Definition: The index is an admittedly rough, but we think sensible, indicator for the extent to which a country was characterized by (i) co-specific investments in productive assets; and (ii) whether farmers, unions, and employers were coordinated and organized in a manner designed to protect and cultivate future investments in these assets” (Cusack et al. 2007: 385).

This is an additive index, which summarizes all indicators (Variables 2.2.1.1, 2.2.1.2, 2.2.2.1, 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3) with Yes = 1 and No = 0:

0 = Low economic coordination.

5 = High economic coordination.

Operationalization: Index 0-5  
Time Period/Year: c. 1900  
Sources: Cusack et al. (2007 385): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## **2.3 Union Run Welfare Schemes**

### **2.3.1 National Unemployment Insurance**

#### **2.3.1.1 Introduction of National Unemployment Insurance**

Definition: Year of national unemployment insurance introduction (either tripartite compulsory insurance, Ghent system or mixed system).

Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Viebrock (2004: 15): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **2.3.1.2 Type of First National Unemployment Insurance**

Definition: Type of first national unemployment insurance:  
- Tripartite compulsory insurance  
- Ghent system  
- Mixed system  
- State insurance

Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Viebrock (2004: 15): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **2.3.2 Ghent System**

#### **2.3.2.1 Year of Termination of Ghent System**

Definition: Year the Ghent system was replaced with compulsory unemployment insurance.  
Operationalization: Year

Time Period/Year: Year of termination  
Sources: Flora/Heidenheimer (2003: 156): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **2.3.2.2 Current Existence of Ghent System**

Definition: Does the Ghent system currently exist in the given country?  
Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Western (1993: 274): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## **2.3.3 Percentage of Total Union Expenditures on Specific Social Policies**

### **2.3.3.1 All Unions in 1907**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure in 1907 of all unions dedicated to specific types of social activities:  
- Travelling  
- Unemployed  
- Health  
- Disabled workers  
- Death  
- Other  
- All social benefits  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1907  
Sources: Internationaler Sekretär der gewerkschaftlichen Landeszentralen (1909: 8-9): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: AT: All organizations are affiliated with the national peak union (according to source).  
BE: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.  
DK: Travel benefits are included in unemployment benefits.  
FI: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. Expenditures of January, February, March, and April 1907 are not included.  
NL: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.  
NO: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.  
SE: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.  
CH: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.

### **2.3.3.2 All Unions in 1912**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure in 1912 of all unions dedicated to specific types of social activities:  
- Travelling  
- Unemployed  
- Health  
- Disabled workers  
- Death  
- Other  
- All social benefits  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1912  
Sources: Internationaler Sekretär der gewerkschaftlichen Landeszentralen (1913: 12-13): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: AT: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. Strike expenditures are not included in total expenditures.  
BE: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.  
DK: Travel benefits are included in unemployment benefits.  
NL: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.  
NO: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. Travel benefits are included in unemployment benefits.

CH: Data only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.

### **2.3.3.3 All Unions Affiliated to the Main Peak Union in 1907**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure in 1907 of all unions affiliated to the main peak union dedicated to specific types of social activities:

- Travelling
- Unemployed
- Health
- Disabled Workers
- Death
- Other
- All Social Benefits

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1907

Sources: Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund (1909: 8-9): AT, BE, DK, DE, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: FI: Expenditures of January, February, March, and April 1907 are not included.  
DK: Travel benefits are included in unemployment benefits.

### **2.3.3.4 All Unions Affiliated to the Main Peak Union in 1912**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure in 1912 of all unions affiliated to the main peak union dedicated to specific types of social activities:

- Travelling
- Unemployed
- Health
- Disabled Workers
- Death
- Other
- All Social Benefits

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1912

Sources: Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund (1913: 12-13): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: AT: Strike expenditures are not included in total expenditures.  
DK: Travel benefits are included in unemployment benefits.

### **2.3.3.5 All Unions Affiliated to the Main Peak Union in 1927**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure in 1912 of all unions affiliated to the main peak union dedicated to specific types of social activities:

- Unemployed
- Health, disabled workers and death

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1927

Sources: Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund (1930: 58): AT, BE, DK, DE, NL, SE, CH.

Footnotes: DE: Unemployment expenditures not published.

### **2.3.3.6 All Unions Affiliated to the Main Peak Union in 1930**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure in 1912 of all unions affiliated to the main peak union dedicated to specific types of social activities:

- Unemployed
- Health, disabled workers and death

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1930

Sources: Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund (1934): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NL, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **2.3.4 Union Expenditures on Strikes**

### **2.3.4.1 All Unions in 1907 and 1912**

Definition: Percentage of the total union expenditure dedicated to strikes in 1907 and 1912 of all

	unions.
Operationalization:	Percentage
Time Period/Year:	1907 and 1912
Sources:	Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund (1909: 8-9; 1913: 12-13): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	AT: Data for 1907 and 1912 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. Strike expenditures are freely organized, because unions were not allowed to maintain statutory strike funds. BE: Data for 1907 and 1912 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. FI: Data for 1907 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. Expenditures of January, February, March, and April 1907 are not included. NL: Data for 1907 and 1912 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. NO: Data for 1907 and 1912 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. SE: Data for 1907 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union. CH: Data for 1907 and 1912 only for organizations affiliated with the main peak union.

### 2.3.4.2 Unions Affiliated to the Main Peak Organization in 1907, 1912, 1927 and 1930

Definition:	Percentage of the total union expenditure dedicated to strikes in 1907, 1912, 1927 and 1930 of the unions affiliated to the main peak organization.
Operationalization:	Percentage
Time Period/Year:	1907, 1912, 1927 and 1930
Sources:	Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund (1909: 8-9; 1913: 12-13; 1930: 58; 1934): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	AT: Strike expenditures in 1907 and 1912 were freely organized, because unions were not allowed to maintain statutory strike funds. Data for 1927 and 1930 not published. FI: Data for 1930 not published.

## 3 Industrial Relations, Coordination and Corporatism

### 3.1 Trade Unions

#### 3.1.1 Dominant Union Types

##### 3.1.1.1 Private

Definition:	Dominant type of private trade union based on the average percent of membership share. This classification is based upon the type with the highest membership share in 1995, and includes the percentage of the dominant type for 1995. The possible types are: a) All Grades Sector: All white-collar and blue-collar occupations. b) Blue-Collar Sector c) White-Collar Sector d) General Union: Unions with a broad membership base, traditionally made up of un- and semi-skilled workers, without clear sector boundaries. e) Blue-Collar Craft f) White-Collar Association (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13)
Operationalization:	Classification and percentage
Time Period/Year:	1995
Sources:	Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	AT: No data for general unions, blue-collar craft unions and white-collar associations. SE: No data for general trade unions private. SE has another category, prof./staff associations for private unions that makes up no more than 12.1 percent at its peak. It isn't included in the data set. NO: The Blue-Collar Sector was dominant through 1990. CH: The Blue-Collar Sector was dominant through 1990.

### **3.1.1.2 Public**

Definition:	Dominant type of public trade union based on the average percent of membership share. This classification is based upon the type with the highest membership share in 1995, and includes the percentage of the dominant type for 1995. The possible types are: a) All Grades Sector: All white-collar and blue-collar occupations. b) Blue-Collar Sector c) White-Collar Sector d) General Union: Unions with a broad membership base, traditionally made up of un- and semi-skilled workers, without clear sector boundaries. e) Blue-Collar Craft f) White-Collar Association (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13).
Operationalization:	Classification and percentage
Time Period/Year:	1995
Sources:	Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	BE: No data for all-grades public unions and public blue-collar craft unions. SE: No data for general trade unions public. CH: No data for general trade unions public, the All Grades Sector was dominant through 1980. NL: No data for Blue-Collar Public and General Union Public. SE: has another category, prof./staff associations for public unions that makes up no more than 17.6 percent at its peak. It isn't included in the data set.

## **3.1.2 Union Membership Share by Type**

### **3.1.2.1 All Grades Sector (Private)**

Definition:	Membership share in the private all grades sector (all white-collar and blue-collar occupations). (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13)
Operationalization:	Percentage
Time Period/Year:	1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.
Sources:	Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	

### **3.1.2.2 Blue-Collar Sector (Private)**

Definition:	Membership share in the private blue-collar sector. Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.
Operationalization:	Percentage
Time Period/Year:	1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.
Sources:	Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	

### **3.1.2.3 White Collar Sector (Private)**

Definition:	Membership share in the private white-collar sector. Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.
Operationalization:	Percentage
Time Period/Year:	1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.
Sources:	Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.
Footnotes:	DE: Percentages for 1960 and 1970 are approximated.

### **3.1.2.4 General Unions (Private)**

Definition:	Membership share in private general unions for (unions with a broad membership base, traditionally made up of un- and semi-skilled workers, without clear sector boundaries).
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(Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, DE, NL, NO, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.1.2.5 Blue-Collar Craft Unions (Private)**

Definition: Membership share in private blue-collar craft unions.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.1.2.6 White-Collar Associations (Private)**

Definition: Membership share in private white-collar associations.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: DE: Percentages for 1960 and 1970 are approximated.

### **3.1.2.7 All Grades Sector (Public)**

Definition: Membership share in the public all grades sector (all white-collar and blue-collar occupations). (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13)  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.1.2.8 Blue-Collar Sector (Public)**

Definition: Membership share in the public blue-collar sector.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.1.2.9 White Collar Sector (Public)**

Definition: Membership share in the public white-collar sector.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the author.  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.1.2.10 General Unions (Public)**

Definition: Membership share in public general unions for (unions with a broad membership base, traditionally made up of un- and semi-skilled workers, without clear sector boundaries). (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13)  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, DE.  
Footnotes:



### **3.1.2.11 Blue-Collar Craft Unions (Public)**

Definition: Membership share in public blue-collar craft unions.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.1.2.12 White-Collar Associations (Public)**

Definition: Membership share in white-collar associations.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **3.1.3 Total Number of Unions**

### **3.1.3.1 Private**

Definition: Total number of private unions.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.1.3.2 Public**

Definition: Total number of public unions.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995.

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 55 and Table 9 for every country): BE, DK, DE, IT, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **3.1.4 Union Centralization**

### **3.1.4.1 Index of Union Centralization**

Definition: Union centralization is a calculated index ranging from 0 to 4. Calculated as the number of the following powers/capacities that the main union confederation has: power of appointment of affiliates, veto over wage agreements by affiliates, veto over strikes and confederation has its own strike funds (Kenworthy 2003a: 35, Variable: kenwucen in Kenworthy (2003b)). This is Kenworthy's (2003a) construction out of other variables from Golden et al. (2007: Variables = CON11, CON12, CON13, CON14).  
0 = Low union centralization  
4 = High union centralization  
While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

Operationalization: Index 0-4

Time Period/Year: Most recent score for time period: 1950-1992

Sources: Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: FI: Was rated a 3 from 1950 (the beginning of the data) till 1972, when it was changed to a 0.  
IT: Was rated a 2 till 1969, when it was changed to a 1.  
NL: Was rated a 3 till 1968, when it was changed to a 1.

### **3.1.5 Union Concentration**

#### **3.1.5.1 Across Confederations**

**Definition:** The Herfindahl index of union concentration across union confederations indicates the extent to which union members belong to a single confederation rather than being divided among multiple confederations (Kenworthy 2003a: 36, Variable: glwucon1 in Kenworthy (2003b) and Variable: HERF in Golden et al. (2007)).  
0.000 = Low union concentration across confederations.  
1.000 = High union concentration across confederations.  
While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

**Operationalization:** Index 0.000-1.000

**Time Period/Year:** Most recent score for time period: 1950-1992

**Sources:** Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:** DK: Began at 1.000 in 1950 and moved steadily down to 0.573 in 1992.  
FR: Began at 0.637 in 1950 and moved steadily down to 0.274 in 1992.  
NO: Began at 1.000 in 1950 and moved steadily down to 0.500 in 1992.

#### **3.1.5.2 Within Confederations**

**Definition:** The Herfindahl index of union concentration for affiliates of the largest union confederation, using the membership of the three largest affiliates and the total number of affiliates. Created by Golden et al. (2007). (Variable: APPHRF1 in Golden et al. (2007) and Variable: glwucon2 in (Kenworthy 2003b)).  
This variable indicates the extent to which the membership of the largest union confederation is concentrated within a smaller number of affiliates rather than being spread out across a large number of affiliates (Kenworthy 2003b: 36).  
0.000 = Low union concentration within confederations.  
1.000 = High union concentration within confederations.  
While this variable varies over time and is measured in five-year intervals, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

**Operationalization:** Index 0.000-1.000

**Time Period/Year:** Most recent score for time period: 1950-1992

**Sources:** Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

### **3.1.6 Union Membership**

#### **3.1.6.1 Total Membership**

**Definition:** Total union membership (reported overall membership) in 1000s (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13).

**Operationalization:** Number in 1000s

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1945-1998

**Sources:** Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 13 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### **3.1.6.2 Total Membership Growth**

**Definition:** Total union membership (reported overall membership) growth rate (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1945-1998

**Sources:** Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 13 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### **3.1.6.3 Gross Density of Dependent Employed**

**Definition:** Gross trade union density in percent of dependent employed. Ebbinghaus/ Visser

(2000: 13) define this as the “total (reported) membership as share of the gainfully employed wage and salary owners (excluding unemployed)”.

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 13 for every country): AT, BE, DK, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.1.6.4 Gross Density of Dependent Labor Force**

Definition: Gross trade union density in percent of dependent labor force. Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 13) define this as the “total (reported) membership as share of dependent labour force (including unemployed)”.

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 13 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.1.6.5 Total Passive Members**

Definition: Total union membership for passive members (pensioners, students and conscripts) in 1000s (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13).

Operationalization: Number in 1000s  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 14 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, IT, NL, NO, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.1.6.6 Total Active Members**

Definition: Total union membership for active members (membership without passive members) in 1000s (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 13).

Operationalization: Number in 1000s  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 14 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.1.6.7 Active Membership Growth**

Definition: Total active union membership (membership without passive members) growth rate (Ebbinghaus/ Visser 2000: 13).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 14 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.1.6.8 Net Density of Dependent Employed**

Definition: Net density of dependent employed (%). Ebbinghaus/ Visser (2000: 13) define this as “active membership (excluding pensioners, students etc.) as share of the gainfully employed wage and salary earners (including unemployed)”.

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 14 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, CH.

Footnotes: BE: The data excludes unemployed members.  
DK: The data excludes unemployed members.  
FI: The data excludes unemployed members.

### **3.1.6.9 Net Density of Dependent Labor Force**

Definition: Net density of dependent labor force (%). Ebbinghaus/ Visser (2000: 13) define this as “active membership (excluding pensioners, students etc.) as share of dependent labour force (including unemployed)”.

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998

Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: 59-61 and Table 14 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.1.7 General Trends of Trade Unions**

#### **3.1.7.1 Current Information on Trade Unions**

Definition: A short summary of the way trade unions are organized.

Operationalization: Description (direct quotation)

Time Period/Year: 2007

Sources: Fulton (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

### **3.1.8 Peak Union Organizations**

#### **3.1.8.1 Number of Peak Organizations**

Definition: The total number of current national, inter-industry peak organizations of unions covering at least to complete one-digit ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) sectors. Public sector peaks are excluded. (Traxler et al. 2001: 40-41, 314).

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1991-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 41): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.1.8.2 Current Largest Peak Organization**

Definition: Abbreviation of the largest national, inter-industry peak organization of unions (Traxler et al. 2001: 40), as well as the full name of the association and its year of founding.

Operationalization: Abbreviation, name and year

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998 and year of founding

Sources: Abbreviation: Traxler et al. (2001: 41): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Full name and year of founding: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 3 for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

PT: The data is since 1975.

NL: FNV is the largest since 1975, until 1975 it was NVV.

ES: The data is since 1977, and from 1990-1994 the UGT was the largest peak organization.

BE: Result of an interregional merger.

FI: SAK was founded by Social Democrats in 1930 after Communist takeover of SAJ (founded in 1907). In 1960 Communist-led unions broke away and re-established SAJ. In 1969 SAJ amalgamated with SAK, and the name of SAK was changed from Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten Keskusliitto to Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö. (SAK 2003).

IE: ICTU was formed in 1959, when the ITUC (set up by other confederations in 1894) and the CIU (founded in 1945 after breakaway from existing confederation) amalgamated.

IT: Re-established in 1944 after suppression.

NL: FNV was formed in 1981, when NVV and NKV amalgamated. A ‘federation’ had already been established in 1975.

ES: Formally founded in 1977, yet it emerged in 1958.

### **3.1.8.3 Number of Affiliate Trade Unions**

Definition: Number of affiliate trade unions of the largest peak organization.  
Operationalization: Number and year of data  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1987-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 3 for every country (FR: Table 4)): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.1.8.4 Total Membership of Largest Peak Organization**

Definition: Total membership (not reported membership) in the largest peak organization.  
Operationalization: Number  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 18a for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.1.8.5 Membership Share of Largest Peak Organization**

Definition: Membership share of all union members in the largest peak organization.  
Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series in five-year intervals: 1945-1998  
Sources: Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000: Table 18b for every country): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: NO: The data in the 1955 cell is for 1956.

## **3.2 Firms, Employers and Employers' Associations**

### **3.2.1 Peak Employer Organizations**

#### **3.2.1.1 Largest Employer Peak Organization**

Definition: Name of largest employer peak organization.  
Operationalization: Name  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998  
Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 55): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **3.2.1.2 Direct Affiliates of Largest Employer Peak Organization**

Definition: Number of direct affiliates of the largest employer peak organization (Variable: EAF in Traxler et al. 2001).  
Operationalization: Number  
Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996  
Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 55): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **3.2.1.3 Cross-Sectoral Associations**

Definition: Name, function and domain of cross-sectoral peak-level business interest associations (Traxler/ Huemer (2007: 31-32)).  
Multiple cross-sectoral associations are listed for each country. Every association is than classified according to function and one or more domains.  
The scope of functions is represented by three basic types of business associations:  
a) Pure Trade or Service Association: Specialized in representing product or service market interests.  
b) Pure Employer Association: Dealing only with labor market interests.  
c) Mixed Association.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.  
Operationalization: Name, classification (function) and classification (domain)  
Time Period/Year: 2003  
Sources: Traxler/Huemer (2007: Table 1 for every country (DE: Table 4)): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE,

GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

### **3.2.2 Number of Peak Employer Organizations by Parameter of Demarcation**

#### **3.2.2.1 Pure Employer Associations**

Definition: Number of pure employer associations peaks, excluding pure product market associations and mixed business associations.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: IE: 1991-1998: One association disappeared during this decade.  
NO: 1980-1990: One association disappeared during this decade.  
PT: First year counted is 1975. 1980-1990: Associations disappeared during this decade.  
ES: First year counted is 1977. One association appeared between 1977 and 1979.  
SE: 1991-1998: One association disappeared during this decade.

#### **3.2.2.2 General (Business Sector) Employer Associations**

Definition: Number of inter-industry peak organizations.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: NL: 1991-1998: One association disappeared during this decade.  
PT: First year counted is 1975. One association appeared between 1980 and 1990.  
ES: First year counted is 1977.

#### **3.2.2.3 Firm Size, Production Mode**

Definition: Number of peak organizations in the domain of a specific mode of production and firm size.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: NL: 1970-1979: One association disappeared during this decade. 1991-1998: One association disappeared during this decade.  
PT: First year counted is 1975. 1991-1998: One association appeared during this decade.  
ES: First year counted is 1977. One association appeared between 1977 and 1979.

#### **3.2.2.4 Ownership**

Definition: Number of peak organizations related to ownership. They are specialized in cooperatives or publicly owned firms.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: IT: 1991-1998: One association disappeared during this decade.  
PT: First year counted is 1975.  
ES: First year counted is 1977.  
SE: 1991-1998: One association disappeared during this decade.

#### **3.2.2.5 Ideological/Political**

Definition: Number of peak organizations with political/ideological allegiance.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: NL: 1970-1979: Two associations disappeared during this decade. 1991-1998: Both associations disappeared during this decade.  
PT: First year counted is 1975.  
ES: First year counted is 1977.

### 3.2.2.6 Sector

Definition: Number of inter-industry peak organizations that confine its memberships to a specified, limited number of sectors (mainly industry and service sector).

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: BE: 1970-1979: One association disappeared during this decade.  
NO: 1980-1990: One association appeared during this decade.  
PT: First year counted is 1975. 1980-1990: One association disappeared during this decade. 1991-1998: One association appeared during this decade.  
ES: First year counted is 1977.

### 3.2.3 Business and Employer Centralization

#### 3.2.3.1 Business Centralization

Definition: Business Centralization/Concentration Index by Hicks and Kenworthy (1998). (Variable: HKBUS in Kenworthy (2000) and in Kenworthy (2003b)).  
Definition according to Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642):  
0.0 = Fragmentation among business confederations and/or central confederation with little authority over members.  
0.5 = Central confederation with moderate authority and/or moderately contested by competitors.  
1.0 = Central confederation with substantial authority over members and weakly contested by competing confederations.  
While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

Operationalization: Index 0.0-1.0

Time Period/Year: Most recent score for time period: 1960-1994

Sources: Kenworthy (2000: 37); Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: FR: 0 for 1960-1968, 0.5 for 1969-1980, 0 for 1981-1994.

#### 3.2.3.2 Employer Centralization

Definition: Kenworthy employer centralization index. (Variable: kenwecen in Kenworthy (2003b)).  
Index with three categories:  
1 = No peak employer confederation.  
2 = Peak employer confederation exists, but has none of the powers/resources listed below under 3.  
3 = Peak employer confederation exists and has one or more of the following: power of appointment of affiliates, veto over wage agreements, veto over lockouts, confederation has its own conflict funds.  
The scoring for this index differs from that of Kenworthy union centralization for two reasons. First, while all of the countries have a peak union confederation, some do not have a counterpart business confederation. Second, there is little variation among countries that do have a peak business confederation in the number of powers/capacities held by the confederation.  
This index is constructed from data in Golden et al. (2007: Variables = EMCONV1, EMCONV2, EMCONV3, EMCONV4, EMCONV5).  
While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

Operationalization: Index 1-3

Time Period/Year: Most recent score for time period: 1950-1992

Sources: Kenworthy/Kittel (2003: 26); Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: IT: 3 for 1950-1962, 2 for 1963-1994.  
NL: 3 for 1950-1967, 2 for 1968-1994.

### **3.2.4 Associational Centralization**

#### **3.2.4.1 Direct Affiliates**

**Definition:** Associational centralization of direct affiliates of the largest employer peak (Variable: ECENA in Traxler et al. (2001)).  
The affiliates' formal power is contingent on their right to:

- Conclude collective agreements on behalf of their members.
- Have their own fund for industrial action.
- Veto collective agreements signed by any lower-level bargaining unit.
- Veto lockouts by a lower-level unit.
- Participate in demand formulation and/or bargaining of lower-level units.
- On the affiliates' obligation to submit the ratification of collective agreements to a membership ballot.

This is an additive index, which summarizes all six indicators listed above with Yes = 1 and No = 0:  
0.0 = Low associational centralization.  
6.0 = High associational centralization.  
Please note that if the formal power varies across the affiliates, the measure refers to the most common pattern or the most influential affiliate.

**Operationalization:** Index 0.0-6.0  
**Time Period/Year:** Time period: 1970-1998  
**Sources:** Traxler et al. (2001: 67 and 309): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
**Footnotes:**

#### **3.2.4.2 Employer Organizations over Member Firms**

**Definition:** Control of employer organizations over member firms under the umbrella of the largest peak (Variable: ECENF in Traxler et al. (2001)).  
Employer organizations formal control over member firms decreases when the latter are entitled to:

- Obtain the status of a 'non-conforming' member generally not subject to collective agreements signed by the association.
- Conduct separate negotiations on their own when a collective agreement by the association is not in line with the firm's interest.
- Autonomously organize industrial action.
- Pay their employees more than the amount fixed by the collective agreement signed by the association.

This is an additive index, which summarizes all four indicators listed above  
Yes = -1 and No = 0:  
-4 = Low associational centralization.  
0 = High associational centralization.  
Reference is to the most common pattern or the most influential affiliate in the case of intra-confederal variation.

**Operationalization:** Index -4-0  
**Time Period/Year:** Time period: 1970-1998  
**Sources:** Traxler et al. (2001: 67 and 309): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
**Footnotes:**

#### **3.2.4.3 Largest Employer Peak Organization**

**Definition:** Associational centralization of the largest employer peak organization (Variable: ECENP in Traxler et al. (2001)).  
The largest employer peak's formal power vis-à-vis its direct affiliates is contingent on its right to:

- Conclude collective agreements on behalf of its affiliates.
- Receive a share in dues collected by affiliates.
- Have its own fund for industrial action.
- Veto collective agreements signed by affiliates.
- Veto lockouts by affiliates.



- Participate in demand formulation and/or bargaining of affiliates.
- On the peak's obligation to submit the ratification of collective agreements to a membership ballot.

Since the peak's formal powers increase with the number of rights and decrease with obligations, in constructing the aggregate index of the peak's formal power the authors coded Yes = 1 and No = 0 for the first six indicators, and Yes = 0 and No = 1 for the seventh indicator:

0.0 = Low employer centralization.

7.0 = High employer centralization.

Operationalization: Index 0.0-7.0

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 67 and 309): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.2.5 Employer Governability**

#### **3.2.5.1 Actual Role of the Peak Organization**

Definition: Actual role of the peak in terms of internal coordination, and consultation, negotiation and bargaining with external interlocutors (Variable: EGOVP in Traxler (1999)).

The peak's actual power position depends on whether they are engaged in the following areas:

- Representing members' labor market interests on national corporatist institutions.
- Conducting general consultations with the unions.
- Coordinating collective bargaining of affiliates.
- Negotiating and signing on behalf of the affiliates agreements on wages.
- Negotiating and signing on behalf of the affiliates agreements on non-wage issues. (Traxler 1999: 349).

This is an additive index, which summarizes all six indicators listed above with Yes = 1 and No = 0:

0 = Low employer governability.

6 = High employer governability.

Operationalization: Index 0-6

Time Period/Year: 1990

Sources: Traxler (1999: 350): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.2.5.2 Formal Power of the Peak in Relation to its Affiliates**

Definition: Formal power of the peak in relation to its affiliates (EGOVC in Traxler (1999)).

The right of the focused higher level unit (the peak in relation to its affiliates) to:

- Conclude collective agreements on behalf of lower levels.
- Receive a share of dues collected by lower levels.
- Have its own fund for industrial action.
- Veto lower-level collective agreements.
- Veto lockouts by lower levels.
- Participate in demand formulation and/or bargaining of lower level.
- The obligation to submit the ratification of collective agreements to a membership ballot. (Traxler 1999: 348-349).

This is an additive index, which summarizes all indicators listed above with Yes = 1 and No = 0 for the first six indicators, and Yes = 0 and No = 1 for the seventh indicator:

0.0 = Low employer governability.

7.0 = High employer governability.

Operationalization: Index 0.0-7.0

Time Period/Year: 1990

Sources: Traxler (1999: 350): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **3.2.5.3 Formal Power of the Peak's Direct Affiliates in Relation to Lower Levels**

Definition: Formal power of the peak's direct affiliates in relation to lower levels (EGOVA in Traxler

(1999)).

The right of the focused higher level unit (the peak's direct affiliates in relation to lower levels) to:

- Conclude collective agreements on behalf of lower levels.
- Receive a share of dues collected by lower levels,
- Have its own fund for industrial action.
- Veto lower-level collective agreements.
- Veto lockouts by lower levels.
- Participate in demand formulation and/or bargaining of lower levels.
- The obligation to submit the ratification of collective agreements to a membership ballot. (Traxler 1999: 348-349).

This is an additive index, which summarizes all indicators listed above with Yes = 1 and No = 0 for the first six indicators, and Yes = 0 and No = 1 for the seventh indicator:

0.0 = Low employer governability.

7.0 = High employer governability.

Operationalization: Index 0.0-7.0

Time Period/Year: 1990

Sources: Traxler (1999: 350): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### 3.2.5.4 Formal Associational Control over Member Firms

Definition: Formal associational control over member firms (EGOVF in Traxler 1999).

Formal control over member firms under the umbrella of the peak depends on their right to:

- Obtain the status of a 'non-conforming' member generally not subject to collective agreements signed by the association,
- Conduct separate negotiations on its own when a collective agreement by the association is not in line with the firm's interest,
- Autonomously organize industrial action, and
- Pay its employees more than the amount fixed by the collective agreements signed by the association. (Traxler 1999: 349).

This is an additive index, which summarizes all four indicators listed above

Yes = -1 and No = 0:

-4 = Low employer governability.

0 = High employer governability.

Operationalization: Index -4-0

Time Period/Year: 1990

Sources: Traxler (1999: 350): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### 3.2.5.5 Employer Coordination

Definition: Coordination of employers' associations in collective bargaining (standardized score).

The average country position is based on an index by Layard/ Nickell/ Jackman (1991).

Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.

Operationalization: Index

Time Period/Year: Average score for time period: 1980-1998

Sources: Martin/Swank (2004: 599): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## 3.2.6 Employer Density

### 3.2.6.1 Density of the Largest Employer Peak Organization

Definition: Percentage of employees organized by the peak within its domain. (Variable: LED in Traxler et al. (2001)).

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1980, 1990 and 1996

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 55 and 310): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.2.6.2 Aggregate Employer Density**

Definition: Percentage of employees covered by all employer associations within a country's private sector. (Variable: ED in Traxler et al. (2001)).

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: 1990 and 1995

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 49 and 310): DK, FI, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.2.6.3 Membership as Percentage of Companies**

Definition: Membership in national employer peak associations as percentage of companies.

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source.

Sources: Behrens/Traxler (2003: Table 3): AT, BE, FI, IT, ES.

Footnotes: BE: Membership actually lies within 85% and 90%.

### **3.2.6.4 General Membership Trend Since 1990**

Definition: Short description of the trend in general membership in national employer peak associations.  
Possible short descriptions are:

- No clear trend
- Increasing
- Very stable
- Declining
- Mostly decline
- Slow decline

Operationalization: Classification

Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source.

Sources: Behrens/Traxler (2003: Table 3): FR, GR, IE, LU, PT, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **3.2.7 Employer Integration and Cooperation**

### **3.2.7.1 Employer Policy Process Integration**

Definition: Integration of employers in the national policy process (e.g. boards, commissions) (standardized score). The average country position is based on an index by Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001) to assess employer association participation in corporatist policymaking forums (Martin/Swank 2004: 599).  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.

Operationalization: Index

Time Period/Year: Average score for time period: 1980–1998

Sources: Martin/Swank (2004: 599): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.2.7.2 Cooperation among Firms in Different Industries**

Definition: Level of cooperation among firms in different industries (BusConf in Hicks/Kenworthy (Variable: 1998: 1663)).

1 = Central business confederation with substantial authority over members and weakly contested by competing federations.

0.5 = Central confederation with moderate authority and/or moderately contested by competitors.

0 = Fragmentation among business federations and/or central federation with little authority over members.

Operationalization: Index 0, 0.5, 1

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989

Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes: FR: Data for 1981-1989. Older data: 0 for 1960-1968, 0.5 for 1969-1980.

### 3.2.7.3 Investor-Firm Cooperation

**Definition:** Long-term voice-based relationships between firms and their investors (Variable: InvFirms in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1664)).  
1 = Large investors hold significant ownership shares for long periods. In some nations, most firms rely heavily on long-term debt rather than equity or are privately owned.  
0.5 = Relatively decentralized ownership but with only moderate investor turnover.  
0 = Decentralized ownership with a high turnover rate (i.e. frequent investor resort to exit rather than voice).

**Operationalization:** Index 0, 0.5, 1

**Time Period/Year:** Time period: 1960-1989

**Sources:** Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:** IE: Data for 1976–89. Older data: 0.5 for 1960-1975.  
NL: Data for 1976-1989. Older Data: 0.5 for 1960-1975.

### 3.2.7.4 Cooperative Purchaser-Supplier Relations

**Definition:** Long-term voice-based relationships between purchaser and supplier firms (Variable: PurchSup in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1664)).  
1 = Extensive use of highly cooperative supplier partnerships by many large firms.  
0.5 = Use of moderately cooperative supplier partnerships by many firms or of highly cooperative partnerships by some firms.  
0 = Infrequent use of supplier partnerships.

**Operationalization:** Index 0, 0.5, 1

**Time Period/Year:** Time period: 1960-1989

**Sources:** Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:** FR: Data for 1987-1989. Older data: 0 for 1960-1986.

### 3.2.7.5 Alliances among Competing Firms

**Definition:** Alliances among competing firms for research and development, training, production, standard setting, etc. (Variable: CompFirms in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1664)).  
1 = Extensive use of alliances, often involving more than two firms.  
0.5 = Moderate use of alliances by many firms, or extensive use by some firms.  
0 = Infrequent use of alliances.

**Operationalization:** Index 0, 0.5, 1

**Time Period/Year:** Time period: 1960-1989

**Sources:** Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:** FR: Data for 1985-1989. Older data: 0 for 1960-1984.  
NL: Data for 1985-1989. Older data: 0 for 1960-1984.

## 3.3 Company Level

### 3.3.1 Cooperation within Firms

#### 3.3.1.1 Long-Term Employment Security Provided by Firms

**Definition:** Long-term employment security provided by firms is an index for labor-management cooperation (Variable: LabMgmt in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1665)).  
1 = Long-term (in some cases lifetime) employment security common in large firms.  
0.5 = Some firms provide medium- or long-term employment security (facilitated by a relatively low unemployment rate).  
0 = Employment security relatively uncommon.

**Operationalization:** Index 0, 0.5, 1

**Time Period/Year:** Time period: 1960-1989

**Sources:** Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### 3.3.1.2 Participatory Work Teams

**Definition:** Cooperation among workers through participatory teams (Variable: WrkrTeams in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1665)).

1 = Extensive use of relatively autonomous, participatory shopfloor work teams (or similar small groups, such as some types of Japanese quality circles) in large firms.  
0.5 = Moderate use of participatory work teams by many firms or extensive use by some firms.  
0 = Infrequent use of participatory work teams.

Operationalization: Index 0, 0.5, 1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989  
Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.1.3 Multidivisional Project Teams within Firms**

Definition: Multidivisional project teams within firms. Project teams that link functional divisions or departments within firms (Variable: MdivTeams in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1665)).  
1 = Extensive use of multidivisional teams in large firms.  
0.5 = Moderate use of multidivisional teams by many firms or extensive use by some firms.  
0 = Infrequent use of multidivisional teams.

Operationalization: Index 0, 0.5, 1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989  
Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## **3.3.2 Workers Participation**

### **3.3.2.1 Labor-Management Cooperation**

Definition: Index of economic cooperation between labor and management. "Long-term commitment by employers (employment guarantee), the benefit should be greater willingness on the part of workers to share valuable knowledge, accept productivity-enhancing technology and upgrade skills" (Kenworthy 1995: 157).  
1 = Highly cooperative.  
0.5 = Moderately cooperative.  
0 = Individualistic.

Operationalization: Index 0, 0.5, 1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989  
Sources: Kenworthy (1995: 171): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.2.2 The First Plant Level Industrial Democracy Institution**

Definition: The first plant level industrial democracy institution. "Which institution evolved as the first stronger and lasting plant level representation." (Sorge 1976: 284).  
Plant level industrial democracy institutions:  
- Legal works council  
- Shop steward/shop stewards committee  
- Contractual works council

Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Sorge (1976: 284): BE, DK, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.2.3 Characteristic Shop-Floor Organization of Individual Unions**

Definition: Characteristic shop-floor organization of individual unions as a part of the articulation of trade union movements.

Operationalization: Description  
Time Period/Year: c. 1900, c. 1914, c. 1925, c. 1938, c. 1950, c. 1963, c. 1975 and c. 1990  
Sources: Crouch (1993: 86-88, 4.12, 108-110, 137-139, 164-165, 188-191, 214-217, 244-247, 270-273): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: IT: c. 1900 no confederations.  
PT: c. 1900 no confederations.

#### **3.3.2.4 Name and Definition of Works Councils**

Definition: "Definitions of works councils in EU15 regulations on employee information and consultation" (Carley et al. 2005: Table 1, 6).

Operationalization: Name and definition

Time Period/Year: 2003

Sources: Carley et al. (2005: 6-8): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

#### **3.3.2.5 Current Types of Works Councils and their Current Legal Basis**

Definition: Current types of works councils and their current legal basis of information and consultation structures (name and year of ruling<sup>9</sup> (Carley et al. 2005: Table 2, 10).

Operationalization: Classification, name and year

Time Period/Year: 2003

Sources: Carley et al. (2005: 10): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

#### **3.3.2.6 Composition and Election Procedure of Works Council-Type Bodies**

Definition: Composition and election procedure of works council-type bodies. Classification of composition and description of election procedure.

Composition types:

- Employee-side only
- Joint Committee

Operationalization: Classification and description

Time Period/Year: 2003

Sources: Carley et al. (2005: 12): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, GR, IT, LU, NL, NO, ES.

Footnotes:

#### **3.3.2.7 Number of Works Councils**

Definition: Total number of works councils.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: 2003

Sources: Carley et al. (2005: 21 and 36): AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, GR, IT, LU, NL, NO.

Footnotes: NO: (43%).

#### **3.3.2.8 Employees Covered by Works Councils Legislation**

Definition: Employees of establishments covered by works council's legislation.

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: 2003

Sources: Carley et al. (2005: 37): AT, BE, IT, NL, ES.

Footnotes: NO: (33%).

#### **3.3.2.9 Establishments Covered by Works Councils Legislation**

Definition: Total number of establishments covered by works councils legislation, total number of establishments and percentage of establishments covered by works councils legislation.

Operationalization: Number and percentage

Time Period/Year: 2003

Sources: Carley et al. (2005: 36): AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, GR, IT, LU, NL.

Footnotes:

### **3.3.3 Workplace Participation**

#### **3.3.3.1 Institutional Fundament of Workplace Representation**

Definition: The institutional fundament of workplace participation.

Institutional fundament:

- Company Agreement or no Regulation
- Collective Agreement
- Law

Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1996  
Sources: Kittel (2000: 221): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### 3.3.3.2 Right of Information

Definition: Existence of a legally institutionalized right of information for the employee representatives in the company.  
Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1996  
Sources: Kittel (2000: 221): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### 3.3.3.3 Cooperation Enforcement

Definition: Existence of a legally institutionalized obligation of cooperation for the employee representatives in the company.  
Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1996  
Sources: Kittel (2000: 221): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: SE: since 1977: Yes

### 3.3.3.4 Veto Rights of Employee Representatives

Definition: Formal veto rights of employee representatives in eight specific company domains.  
Company domains:  
- Acceptance of new workers  
- Dismissal of staff  
- Wage plan  
- Work organization  
- Workplace specification  
- Company specific training  
- New technologies  
- Work schedules  
This is an additive index, which summarizes all eight indicators listed above with 0.00 = No veto rights  
0.40= Eight veto rights  
The domains with veto rights are noted in the section for *Comments*.  
Operationalization: Index 0.00-0.40 and classification  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1996  
Sources: Kittel (2000: 221): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### 3.3.3.5 Institutionalized Workers Representation

Definition: Institutionalized workers representation. This is an additive index, which summarizes the following variables:  
- Variable 3.3.3.1: Institutional Fundament of Workplace Representation (0.00 = Company Agreement or no Regulation, 0.20 = Collective Agreement and 0.40 = Law).  
- Variable 3.3.3.2: Right of Information (0.00 = No and 0.10 = Yes).  
- Variable 3.3.3.3: Cooperation Enforcement (0.00 = No and 0.10 = Yes).  
- Variable 3.3.3.4: Veto Rights of Employee Representatives (see scoring above).  
0.00= Low workers representation  
1.00= High workers representation  
Operationalization: Index 0.00-1.00  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1996  
Sources: Kittel (2000: 221): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: SE: exact value is: 0.30-0.60.  
CH: exact value is: 0.45-0.70.

### **3.3.3.6 Employees' Right to Bargain on Company-Level**

Definition: Admissibility of wage agreements on company level.  
Yes = Representatives of employees have the formal right to negotiate wage agreements on company level.  
No = Representatives of employees do not have the formal right to negotiate enforceable wage agreements on company level.

Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1996  
Sources: Kittel (2000: 221): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.3.7 Current Information on Workplace Representation**

Definition: A short summary of some of the ways workplace representation is organized, and is there workplace representation and if so what form does it take.  
Forms of workplace representation:  
- Works council  
- Union

Operationalization: Classification and description (direct quotation)  
Time Period/Year: 2007  
Sources: Fulton (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

## **3.3.4 Board Participation**

### **3.3.4.1 Co-determination at the Company Level**

Definition: The reach of co-determination within companies. The information refers to large stock corporations from the private sector.  
1 = Absence of co-determination rules at the company level.  
2 = Symbolic participation without the right to vote.  
3 = Participation in administrative boards and board of directors up until one-third participation.  
4 = Forms of participation ranked above one-third participation, yet still below parity.

Operationalization: Index 1-4  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Höpner (2004: 8-9 and 40): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.4.2 Current Information on Board-level Representation**

Definition: A short summary of the way board-level representation is organized and is there board-level representation and if so what form does it take.

Operationalization: Classification and description (direct quotation)  
Time Period/Year: 2007  
Sources: Fulton (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.4.3 Current Information on Financial Participation**

Definition: A short summary of the way financial participation is organized.

Operationalization: Description (direct quotation)  
Time Period/Year: 2007  
Sources: Fulton (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

### **3.3.4.4 Company Board Structure**

Definition: Classification of company board structure.  
Company board structures:  
- Dualistic



- Monistic.  
Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: 2007  
Sources: Fulton (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

## **3.4 Collective Bargaining**

### **3.4.1 Legal Regulation**

#### **3.4.1.1 Most Recent Legal Framework of Collective Bargaining**

Definition: Year, name and description of most recent legal framework on collective bargaining.  
Operationalization: Year, name and description  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Schulten (2005: Table 1): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GRE, IE, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

#### **3.4.1.2 Right to Collective Bargaining is Secured by the Constitution**

Definition: Whether or not the right to collective bargaining is secured by the constitution (it is now secured in all EU countries, Article II-88 of the Treaty).  
Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Schulten (2005: Table 1): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GRE, IE, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

### **3.4.2 Level of Negotiation**

#### **3.4.2.1 Dominant Level of Collective Bargaining**

Definition: At which level is collective bargaining dominant:  
- Intersectoral Level  
- Sectoral Level  
- Company Level  
- No Level Clearly Dominant  
Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Schulten (2005: Table 4): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GRE, IE, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

#### **3.4.2.2 Most Recent Level of Local Wage Bargaining**

Definition: Most recent level of local wage bargaining and its relationship to formal rights of the employee representatives.  
Formalized forms of local wage bargaining of which 1 is the most formal and 11 is the least formal:  
1 = Predominance of single-employer bargaining.  
2 = Statutory right of locals to negotiate wages and call strikes.  
3 = Right of locals to negotiate wages and call strikes established by peak-level agreement.  
4 = Right of locals to negotiate wages under peace obligation laid down by union constitution.  
5 = Right of locals to negotiate wages under peace obligation within the framework of higher-level agreements.  
6 = Limited negotiation mandate of locals within the framework of higher-level agreements on flexible wages.  
No direct formal involvement of locals in pay-fixing:  
7 = Broad range of statutory co-decision powers regarding non-wage issues and subject to peace obligation.  
8 = Narrow range of statutory co-decision powers regarding non-wage issues and

subject to peace obligation.  
9 = Narrow and constrained range of statutory co-decision powers regarding non-wage issues and subject to peace obligation.  
10 = Narrow range of statutory information and consultation rights.  
11 = No specified rights (Traxler et al. 2001:124-125).

Operationalization: Classification 1-11  
Time Period/Year: Average score for time period: 1970-1998  
Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 125): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.4.3 Collective Bargaining Coverage**

#### **3.4.3.1 Adjusted Collective Bargaining Coverage**

Definition: Adjusted collective bargaining coverage (ACOV) is the ratio of employees under a collective agreement to the total number of employees entitled to conclude collective agreements (Traxler et al. 2002: 306-307). The aggregate (i.e. country-wide) adjusted rates of bargaining coverage (Traxler/Behrens 2002: Table 1).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2000  
Sources: For 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996: Traxler et al. (2001: 196): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
For 2000: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 1): AT, DK, FR, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES.  
Footnotes: DK: Data for 1994 not 1996.  
FI: Data for 1995 not 1996.  
FR: Data for 1995 not 1996, exact value in 2000: 90-95.  
PT: Data for 1981 not 1980, for 1991 not 1990, and for 1999 not 2000.  
ES: Data for 1983 not 1980.  
CH: Data for 1991 not 1990.  
NO: Data for 1998 not 2000, exact value in 2000: 70-77.  
NL: Data for 2001 not 2000.

#### **3.4.3.2 Private Sector Collective Bargaining Coverage**

Definition: Private sector collective bargaining coverage (PCOV) is the ratio of employees under a collective agreement to the total number of employees in the private sector (Traxler et al. 2002: 311).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996  
Sources: For 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996: Traxler et al. (2001: 196): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: DK: Data for 1994 not 1996.  
FI: Data for 1995 not 1996.  
FR: Data for 1995 not 1996.  
PT: Data for 1981 not 1980, for 1991 not 1990, and for 1999 not 2000.  
ES: Data for 1983 not 1980.  
CH: Data for 1991 not 1990.  
NO: Data for 1998 not 2000.  
NL: Data for 2001 not 2000.

#### **3.4.3.3 Unadjusted Collective Bargaining Coverage**

Definition: Unadjusted collective bargaining coverage (UCOV) is the ratio of employees under any type of collective agreement to the total number of employees (Traxler et al. 2002: 313). The aggregate (i.e. country-wide) unadjusted rates of bargaining coverage (Traxler/Behrens 2002: Table 1).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2000  
Sources: For 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996: Traxler et al. (2001: 196): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
For 2000: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 1): AT, DK, FR, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES.

Footnotes: DK: Data for 1994 not 1996.  
FI: Data for 1995 not 1996.  
FR: Data for 1995 not 1996, exact value in 2000: 90-95.  
PT: Data for 1981 not 1980, for 1991 not 1990, and for 1999 not 2000.  
ES: Data for 1983 not 1980.  
CH: Data for 1991 not 1990.  
NO: Data for 1998 not 2000, exact value in 2000: 70-77.  
NL: Data for 2001 not 2000.

#### **3.4.3.4 Coverage Rates by Sector (Public and Private)**

Definition: Collective bargaining coverage rates by sector (public and private).  
Sectors are:  
- Public Sector  
- Private Sector

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 2001

Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 3): AT, DK, DE, NL, NO, PT, SE.

Footnotes: DE: Data for 2000 not 2001, and data for West Germany and East Germany is separated.  
NL: Data for 1998 not 2001.  
PT: Data for the public sector is for 1999 not 2001.

#### **3.4.3.5 Coverage Rates by Sector (Industry)**

Definition: Collective bargaining coverage rates by sector (industry).  
The industry classification follows the NACE ("Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne." A statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community) major divisions:  
- Agriculture (hunting, forestry and fishing)  
- Mining (quarrying)  
- Manufacturing  
- Utilities (electricity, gas and water supply)  
- Construction  
- Trade (wholesale, retail, or repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal household goods)  
- Hotels (restaurants),  
- Transport (storage and communication)  
- Finance (real estate, renting and business activities)  
- Public (administration, defense and compulsory social security)  
- Education (health, social work, or other community, social and personal service activities)

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 2000

Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 4): AT, DK, DE, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES.

Footnotes: DE: Data for West Germany and East Germany is separated.  
NL: Employees covered via extension are excluded.  
NO: Data is for 1998 not 2000.  
PT: Data for 1999 not 2000.

#### **3.4.3.6 Coverage Rates by Bargaining Level**

Definition: Collective bargaining coverage rates by bargaining level for the private sector.  
Bargaining levels for the private sector are:  
- Single-Employer  
- Multi-Employer

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: 2000

Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 5): AT, DK, DE, LU, NL, PT, ES.

Footnotes: DE: Data for West Germany and East Germany is separated and the data is for the private and public sector.

NL: Data for 2001 not 2000.  
PT: Data for 1999 not 2000.  
ES: Data is for the private and public sector.

### **3.4.4 General Trends in Collective Bargaining**

#### **3.4.4.1 Main Pattern of Industrial Relations**

**Definition:** The main pattern of industrial relations as a part of the institutional development of industrial relations.

**Operationalization:** Description

**Time Period/Year:** c. 1870, c. 1900, c. 1914, c. 1925, c. 1938, c. 1950, c. 1963, c. 1975 and c. 1990

**Sources:** Crouch (1993: 69, 81-83, 102-104, 130-133, 158-160, 180-185, 206-210, 235-238, 262-265): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:** DE: Table 4.1 (c. 1870) German Reich excludes Alsace-Lorraine. Table 5.1 (c. 1925) Territory of Post-Versailles Germany. Table 6.1 (c. 1950) Germany is now the reduced post-war Federal Republic.  
AT: Table 4.1 (c. 1870) Austrian Reich excludes Hungary and Bosnia-Herzgovina. Table 5.1 (c. 1925) Territory of Restösterreich.  
ES: Table 4.1 (c. 1870) Catalonia only  
FI: Table 6.1 (c. 1950) Finland has lost Karelia to the USSR.

#### **3.4.4.2 Current Information on Collective Bargaining**

**Definition:** A classification of the principle level of collective bargaining and a short summary of the way collective bargaining is organized.  
Principle levels of collective bargaining are:  
- Industry  
- National

**Operationalization:** Classification and description (Direct quotation)

**Time Period/Year:** 2007

**Sources:** Fulton (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE.

**Footnotes:**

### **3.4.5 Wage-Setting Arrangements**

#### **3.4.5.1 Involvement of Union and Employer Confederations in Wage Setting**

**Definition:** Involvement of union and employer confederation(s) in wage setting from Golden et al. (2007), (Variable: CONINV in Golden et al. (2007) and Variable: glwcenc in Kenworthy (2003b)).  
1.0 = Confederation(s) uninvolved in wage-setting in any of the subsequent ways.  
2.0 = Confederation(s) participates in talks or in formulation of demands for some affiliates.  
3.0 = Confederation(s) participates in talks or in formulation of demands for all affiliates.  
4.0 = Confederation(s) negotiates non-wage benefits.  
5.0 = Confederation(s) negotiates a part of the wage agreement, such as the cost-of-living-adjustment.  
6.0 = Confederation(s) represents affiliates in mediation with centralized ratification.  
7.0 = Confederation(s) represents affiliates in arbitration.  
8.0 = Confederation(s) bargains for affiliates in industry-level negotiations.  
9.0 = Confederation(s) negotiates national wage agreement without peace obligation.  
10.0 = Confederation(s) negotiates national wage agreement with peace obligation.  
11.0 = Confederation(s) negotiates national wage agreement with limits on supplementary bargaining.  
Definition according to Golden et al. (2007) and according to Kenworthy (2003a: 37-38). While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

**Operationalization:** Index 1.0-11.0

**Time Period/Year:** Most recent score for time period: 1950-1992

Sources: Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.4.5.2 Overall Wage Setting Centralization**

Definition: Overall wage setting centralization from Golden et al. (2007), (Variable: BARGLEV in Golden et al. (2007) and Variable: glwcn in Kenworthy (2003b)).

1.0 = Plant-level wage-setting.

2.0 = Industry-level wage-setting.

3.0 = Central wage setting without sanctions.

4.0 = Central wage setting with sanctions.

Definition according to Golden et al. (2007) and according to Kenworthy (2003a: 38).

While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

Operationalization: Index 1.0-4.0

Time Period/Year: Most recent score for time period: 1950-1992

Sources: Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.4.5.3 Wage Coordination Mode**

Definition: Wage coordination mode index from Traxler et al. (2001), (variable: Tbkcoor in Kenworthy (2003b) and variable: BMO in Traxler et al. (2001)).

Bargaining modes of macro-coordination of wages:

1 = Inter-associational coordination by the peaks of unions and employer associations.

2 = Intra-associational coordination by the peaks.

3 = Patter bargaining

4 = State-imposed coordination.

5 = Uncoordinated bargaining.

6 = State-sponsored coordination.

Definition according to Traxler et al. (2001: 308) and according to Kenworthy (2002a: 39).

While this variable varies over time and is measured annually, the most recent score is listed here and any prior scores are listed in the footnotes.

Operationalization: Index 1-6

Time Period/Year: Most recent score for time period: 1970-1990

Sources: Kenworthy (2003b): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.4.5.4 Coordinated Wage Bargaining**

Definition: Coordinated wage bargaining (variable: WageCoor in Hicks/Kenworthy 1998):

1 = Wage negotiations coordinated and/or conducted by centralized or concentrated labor and employer confederations, in some cases with government involvement.

0.5 = Moderate coordination at the central or industry level.

0 = Fragmented bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.

Operationalization: Index 0, 0.5, 1

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989

Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **3.4.6 Industrial Conflict**

### **3.4.6.1 Number of Strikes**

Definition: Number of industrial disputes (strikes and lockouts).

Operationalization: Number

Time Period/Year: Time series: 1960-2006

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **3.4.6.2 Number of Workers Involved**

Definition: Workers involved in labor disputes, in thousands.  
Operationalization: Number in 1000s  
Time Period/Year: 1960-2006  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.4.6.3 Working Days Lost**

Definition: Working-days lost (due to strikes and lockouts), in thousands.  
Operationalization: Number in 1000s  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1960-2006  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.4.6.4 Index of Striking**

Definition: Index of strike activity: Working days lost per 1000 workers.  
Operationalization: Index (Number)  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1960-2006  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## **3.5 Corporatism**

### **3.5.1 Cooperation in Political Economy**

#### **3.5.1.1 Cooperation between Government and Interest Groups**

Definition: Cooperation between government and interest groups. Cohesive government and interest group interrelations. (Variable: GovtInts in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1663)).  
1 = Relatively cooperative interaction between cohesive government agencies and coordinated business and labor organizations.  
0.5 = Moderate cooperation.  
0 = Relatively combative, conflictual relationship between fragmented state agencies and interest group organizations.  
Operationalization: Index 0, 0.5, 1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989  
Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **3.5.1.2 Societally Tilted Tripartite Neocorporatism**

Definition: Societally tilted tripartite neocorporatism. (TNC-LC, from Lijphart/Crepaz 1991 in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998)).  
0.00 = Low societally tilted neocorporatism.  
1.00 = High societally tilted neocorporatism.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.  
Operationalization: Index 0.00-1.00  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989  
Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **3.5.1.3 Politically Tilted Tripartite Neocorporatism**

Definition: Politically and social democratic tilted tripartite neocorporatism. (TNC-HS, from Hicks/Swank 1992 in Hicks/Kenworthy (1998)).  
0.00 = Low politically tilted neocorporatism.  
1.00 = High politically tilted neocorporatism.  
Please note that no further definition is provided by the authors of the source.  
Operationalization: Index 0.00-1.00  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1989

Sources: Hicks/Kenworthy (1998: 1642-1643): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.5.1.4 Economic Cooperation**

Definition: A numerical index of the degree of economic cooperation. The nine dimensions of cooperation are for:

- Macro level industries
- Macro level unions
- Macro level government-interest Groups
- Meso level purchasers-suppliers
- Meso level investors-producers
- Meso level competing firms
- Micro level labor-Management
- Micro level workers
- Micro level production chain. (Kenworthy 1995: 170)

This is an additive index, which summarizes all the nine indicators listed above with 1.0 = Highly cooperative, 0.5 = Moderately cooperative and 0.0 = Individualistic:  
0.0 = Low economic cooperation.  
9.0 = High economic cooperation.

Operationalization: Index 0.0-9.0  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the author of the source.  
Sources: Kenworthy (1995: 170-171): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **3.5.1.5 Siaroff Index**

Definition: The Siaroff Index is defined as “a long-term cooperative pattern of shared economic management involving the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social policy, etc.)” (Siaroff 1999: 189). “The Siaroff Index can be considered as a proxy for corporatism” (Armingeon et al. 2008).

1.000 = Least integrated economy.  
5.000 = Greatest integrated economy.

Operationalization: Index 1.000-5.000  
Time Period/Year: Late 1960s, late 1970s, late 1980s and mid-1990s  
Sources: Siaroff (1999: 189-194): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## **4 The State**

### **4.1 Institutional and Constitutional Structures and Constraints of the State**

#### **4.1.1 Executive-Parties Dimension**

##### **4.1.1.1 Index of Executives-Parties Dimension**

Definition: The executive-party dimension is Lijphart’s (1999) first dimension of the ten differences of democratic institutions and rules deduced from the majoritarian and consensus principles. The first dimension is composed of five characteristics:

- Party system (see Variable: 4.1.1.2).
- Executive power (see Variable: 4.1.1.3).
- Relationship between executive and legislative (see Variable: 4.1.1.4).
- Electoral system (see Variable: 4.1.1.5).
- Interest groups (see Variable: 4.1.1.6)

(Lijphart 1999: 2-3).

Operationalization: Index  
Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996  
Sources: Armington et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.1.2 Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) first variable of the executive-party dimension. Lijphart (1999) uses the Laakso-Taagepera index (1979) which measures the degree of party system fragmentation and takes into account the number of parliamentary parties as well as their size. Systems with fewer legislative parties tend to be more majoritarian (Vatter 2009: 132).

Operationalization: Index (Number)  
Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996  
Sources: Armington et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.1.3 Minimal Winning One-Party Cabinets**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) second variable of the executive-party dimension. "Lijphart (1999) measures the concentration of executive power in terms of the proportion of governments during a given period that were either minimal winning or single-party cabinets. A greater proportion of minimal winning or single-party cabinets increases the likelihood of a greater concentration of executive power and, therefore, tends toward a more majoritarian political system. It should be noted that Lijphart's category of single-party cabinets includes both single-party minority cabinets and single-party majority cabinets" (Vatter 2009: 132).

Operationalization: Index (Percentage)  
Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996  
Sources: Armington et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.1.4 Executive Dominance**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) third variable of the executive-party dimension. This variable concerns the relationship between executive and legislative branches of government (Lijphart 1999: 116).  
"Lijphart (1999) measures this variable in terms of the average cabinet duration, in days, for the period in question. A more durable cabinet tends to increase the likelihood of a more dominant executive (vis-à-vis the legislature), and therefore tends toward a more majoritarian system" (Vatter 2009: 134).

Operationalization: Index  
Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996  
Sources: Armington et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.1.5 Disproportionality**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) fourth variable of the executive-party dimension. Lijphart uses "the Gallagher index of disproportionality to measure the degree to which the electoral systems skew the relationship between votes and seats in parliament: the greater the disproportionality, the more majoritarian the electoral system" (Vatter 2009: 135).

Operationalization: Index (Percentage)  
Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996  
Sources: Armington et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.1.6 Interest Group Pluralism**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) fifth variable of the executive-party dimension. "Lijphart (1999) uses an index of interest group pluralism developed by Siaroff (1999) based on eight indicators and generates a comprehensive score:  
1.0 = Highly pluralist.



5.0 = Highly corporatist. (Vatter 2009: 135).

Operationalization: Index 1.0-5.0

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

## **4.1.2 Federal-Unitary Dimension**

### **4.1.2.1 Index of Federal-Unitary Dimension**

Definition: The federal-unitary dimension is Lijphart's (1999) second dimension of the ten differences of democratic institutions and rules deduced from the majoritarian and consensus principles. The second dimension is composed of five characteristics, which contrast federalism and unitary government (Lijphart 1999: 2-3):

- Federalism (see Variable: 4.1.2.2).
- Bicameralism (see Variable: 4.1.2.3).
- Constitutional rigidity (see Variable: 4.1.2.4).
- Judicial review (see Variable: 4.1.2.5).
- Central bank independence (see Variable: 4.1.2.6).

Operationalization: Index

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **4.1.2.2 Federalism**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) first variable of the federal-unitary dimension.

The variable consists of two categories:

- Federal or unitary systems: Adoption and maintaining of a federal constitution.
- Centralized or decentralized subclasses.
  - 1.0 = Unitary and centralized.
  - 2.0 = Unitary and decentralized.
  - 3.0 = Semi-federal.
  - 4.0 = Federal and centralized.
  - 5.0 = Federal and decentralized.

Operationalization: Index 1.0-4.0

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **4.1.2.3 Bicameralism**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) second variable of the federal-unitary dimension. "For his measurement of the distribution of power within the legislature, Lijphart (1999) uses three features (bicameral vs. unicameral; symmetrical vs. asymmetrical; congruent vs. incongruent) in order to derive an index of bicameralism. Lijphart's scale ranges from 1.0 (unicameral), a majoritarian characteristic, to 4.0 (strong bicameralism), a consensus attribute" (Vatter 2009: 137).

- 1.0 = Unicameralism.
- 1.5 = One-and-a-half chamber.
- 2.0 = Weak bicameralism: Asymmetrical and congruent chambers.
- 2.5 = Between medium-strength and weak bicameralism
- 3.0 = Medium strength bicameralism: Asymmetrical and incongruent chambers.
- 4.0 = Strong bicameralism: Symmetrical and incongruent chambers.

Operationalization: Index 1.0-4.0

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **4.1.2.4 Constitutional Rigidity**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) third variable of the federal-unitary dimension. According to Lijphart

(1999: 219), the great variety of constitutional provisions can be reduced to four basic types:

1.0 = Approval of a constitutional reform by an ordinary majority.

2.0 = Approval by more than an ordinary but less than a two-thirds majority or ordinary majority plus referendum.

3.0 = Approval by a two-thirds majority or equivalent.

4.0 = Approval by more than a two-thirds majority or a two-thirds majority combined with other requirements (Vatter 2009: 137).

Operationalization: Index 1.0-4.0

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **4.1.2.5 Judicial Review**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) fourth variable of the federal-unitary dimension. "In order to measure the strength of judicial review, Lijphart (1999: 225) uses a four-fold classification based first on the distinction between the presence and absence of judicial review and second, on three degrees of activism in the assertion of this power by the courts" (Vatter 2009: 137).

1.0 = No judicial review.

2.0 = Weak judicial review.

3.0 = Medium-strength judicial review.

4.0 = Strong judicial review.

Operationalization: Index 1.0-4.0

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **4.1.2.6 Central Bank Independence**

Definition: Lijphart's (1999) fifth variable of the federal-unitary dimension. "To measure the independence of central banks, Lijphart (1999: 235) uses the mean value of the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti, the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini and Central Bank Governors' turnover rate indices:

0.00 = Low independence.

1.00 = High independence (Vatter 2009: 137-138).

Operationalization: Index 0.00-1.00

Time Period/Year: Time periods: 1945-1970, 1971-96 and 1960-1996

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **4.1.3 Institutional Constraints of Central State Government**

#### **4.1.3.1 Index of Institutional Constraints of Central State Government**

Definition: Index of institutional constraints of central state government from 1960-1990 according to Schmidt (1996).

Institutional constraints:

- EU membership in most of the period under study

- Degree of centralization of state structure (federalism = Yes)

- Difficulty of amending constitutions (very difficult = Yes)

- Strong bicameralism

- Central bank autonomy

- Frequent referenda

This is an additive index, which summarizes all six indicators listed above with Yes = 1 and No = 0:

0 = Large maneuvering room available to central state government.

5 = Powerful constraints.

While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-5  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1996  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.2 Institutional Pluralism**

Definition: Augmented index of 'institutional pluralism' by Colomer (1995: 20).  
- Effective number of parties  
- Bicameralism  
- Elected president  
- Decentralization  
This is an additive index, which summarizes all four indicators listed above (coded 0, 1 or 2):  
0 = Low institutional pluralism  
7 = High institutional pluralism  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-7  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1996  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.3 Constitutional Structures**

Definition: Augmented index of constitutional structures by Huber et al. (1993: 727-728).  
This is an additive index and assesses constitutional provisions that obstruct rule by narrow majorities (or conversely give minorities the opportunity to veto legislation). The countries are scored using the information and classifications presented by Lijphart (1984 and 1999).  
The index is composed of five indicators (see Variables 4.1.3.4 – 4.1.3.9):  
0 = Low constitutionalist structures.  
9 = High constitutionalist structures.  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-9  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-1996  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.4 Federalism**

Definition: Federalism (Huber et al. 2004).  
0 = No  
1 = Weak  
2 = Strong  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-2  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-2000  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.5 Presidential System**

Definition: Presidential system (Huber et al. 2004).  
0 = Parliamentary  
1 = President or collegial executive  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-2000

Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.6 Electoral System**

Definition: Electoral system-single member districts or proportional representation (Huber et al. 2004).  
0 = Proportional representation  
1 = Modified proportional representation  
2 = Single-member, simple plurality systems  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-2  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-2000  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.7 Strength of Bicameralism**

Definition: Strength of bicameralism (Huber et al. 2004).  
0 = No second chamber or second chamber with very weak powers.  
1 = Weak bicameralism  
2 = Strong bicameralism  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-2  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-2000  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.8 Referendum**

Definition: Referendum (Huber et al. 2004).  
0 = None or infrequent  
1 = Frequent  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-2000  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.1.3.9 Judicial Review**

Definition: Judicial review (Huber et al. 2004).  
0 = No  
1 = Yes  
While this variable was originally measured annually, there was no variation, therefore only one score is given.

Operationalization: Index 0-1  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1960-2000  
Sources: Armingeon et al. (2008): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

## **4.2 Role of the State in Collective Bargaining**

### **4.2.1 Degree of State Involvement in Collective Bargaining**

#### **4.2.1.1 Government Intervention in Wage Setting**

Definition: Index by Hassel (2006) of general government intervention in wage setting, based on a recoding of the index of Government Involvement in Wage Setting by Golden et al. (2007) (see Variable 4.2.2).

Five steps from low to strong intervention:

- 1 = No role of government in wage setting,
- 2 = Government influences bargaining by providing an institutional framework of consultation (includes the German concerted action or the Party Commission in Austria).
- 3 = Government determines wage bargaining outcomes indirectly (includes the minimum wage setting by the French government and the Wassenaar Agreement in the Netherlands).
- 4 = Government participates in wage bargaining (as in Finland and Spain until 1987).
- 5 = Government negotiates social pact or imposes private sector wage settlements (direct legislative measures such as in Belgium).

Operationalization: Index 1-5  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1970-1999  
Sources: Hassel (2006: 75-77 and 256): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.2.1.2 Government Involvement in Wage Setting**

Definition: Index of government involvement in wage-setting (Variable: GOVIN in et al. (2007)).  
Coding as follows:  
1 = Government uninvolved in wage setting.  
2 = Government establishes minimum wage(s).  
3 = Government extends collective agreements.  
4 = Government provides economic forecasts to bargaining partners.  
5 = Government recommends wage guidelines or norms.  
6 = Government and unions negotiate wage guidelines.  
7 = Government imposes wage controls in selected industries.  
8 = Government imposes cost of living adjustment.  
9 = Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule without sanctions.  
10 = Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule with sanctions.  
11 = Government arbitrator imposes wage schedules without sanctions on unions.  
12 = Government arbitrator imposes national wage schedule with sanctions.  
13 = Government imposes national wage schedule with sanctions.  
14 = Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule with supplementary local bargaining prohibited.  
15 = Government imposes wage freeze and prohibits supplementary local bargaining.

Operationalization: Index 1-15  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1950–2000  
Sources: Golden et al. (2007): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, LU, NL, NO, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **4.2.2 Procedural Role of the State in Collective Bargaining**

#### **4.2.2.1 Extension of Collective Agreements in the Narrow Sense**

Definition: Existence of extension in the narrow sense (i.e. based on the erga omnes principle).  
Definition of extension in the narrow sense: “[...] makes a collective agreement generally binding within its field of application by explicitly binding all those employees and employers which are not members of the parties to the agreement” (Traxler/Behrens 2002).

Operationalization: Yes/No  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source.  
Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 7): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.2.2.2 Enlargement of Collective Agreements**

Definition: Existence of enlargement: “*Enlargement*, which provides for a collective agreement concluded elsewhere to apply in sectors or areas where no union and/or employers’ association capable of collective bargaining exists. Through enlargement, a certain collective agreement is made binding for a specific geographical or sectoral area

outside this agreement's actual scope" (Traxler/Behrens 2002).

Operationalization: Yes/No

Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source.

Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 7): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

#### 4.2.2.3 Formal Extensions Mechanisms of Collective Agreements

Definition: Existence of functional equivalents to formal extensions mechanisms: "*Functional equivalents*, such as compulsory membership of the bargaining parties' organisations or legal provisions requiring government contractors to comply with the terms of a relevant collective agreement. Such functional equivalents are not based on formal extension mechanisms but do in effect extend the provisions of an agreement to a larger constituency" (Traxler/Behrens 2002).

Operationalization: Yes/No

Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source.

Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 7): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

#### 4.2.2.4 Characteristics of Erga Omnes Extension Procedures

Definition: Characteristics of the procedure of Erga Omnes Extensions.

- Who or what is the initiator of the extension.
- To what is the agreement extended.
- Minimum requirements for extension.
- Special extension procedures.

Operationalization: Descriptions

Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the source.

Sources: Traxler/Behrens (2002: Table 8): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE.

Footnotes:

#### 4.2.2.5 Modes of Extension Practice

Definition: Practice of extending multi-employer agreements to employers unaffiliated to the bargaining units, measured as the percentage of private-sector employees exclusively covered by extension (Variable: EXTP in Traxler et al. (2001)).

1 = No notable extension practice.

2 = Moderate practice (i.e. 5-25% of all private-sector employees covered).

3 = Pervasive practice.

Operationalization: Index 1-3

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 184 and 310): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### 4.2.2.6 Legal Enforceability of Collective Agreements

Definition: Legal enforceability of collective agreements means that labor law makes collective agreements binding for the signatory parties.

0 = No

1 = Yes

Operationalization: Index 0-1

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 184 and 185): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### 4.2.2.7 Peace Obligation during Validity of Agreement

Definition: Peace obligation means that industrial action is prohibited as long as a collective agreement is in force. Four possibilities:

0 = Non-existing.

1 = Dubious.

2 = Optional.

3 = Automatically follows from the agreement.

Operationalization: Index 0-3  
Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998  
Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 184 and 186): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.2.2.8 Peace Obligation of Works Councils**

Definition: Peace obligation concerning wage bargaining. Applies only when works councils are the most important employee representation system (Statutory employee representatives formally independent of the unions).

Operationalization: Yes/No

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 184 and 186-187): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **4.2.2.9 Bargaining Governability**

Definition: Governability of collective bargaining (Variable: BGOV in Traxler et al. (2001)).

Aggregate score made out of the following variables:

- Legal Enforceability of Collective Agreements (Variable 4.2.2.6).
- Peace Obligation During Validity of Agreement (Variable 4.2.2.7).
- Peace Obligation of Works Councils (variable 4.2.2.8).

The index can be 0 or 1:

0 = low (if Variable 4.2.2.6 = 0, Variable 4.2.2.7 = 0-2, and Variable 4.2.2.8 (if applicable) = 0).

1 = high (if Variable 4.2.2.6 = 1, Variable 4.2.2.7 = 3, and Variable 4.2.2.8 (if applicable) = 1).

Operationalization: Index 0-1

Time Period/Year: Time period: 1970-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001: 184 and 308): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **4.2.2.10 Substantive State Interference in Private Sector Wage Bargaining**

Definition: Description of substantive state interference in private sector wage bargaining.

Three main categories with several sub-categories:

- State imposed regulation (The state acts as a sovereign power). Sub-categories: unilateral regulation, Regular arbitration, Ad-hoc arbitration or Public-sector pace-setting.
- State-sponsored regulation (The state does not claim a superior role but joins the bargaining process as an additional party). Sub-categories: Tripartism with authoritative implementation, tripartism without authoritative implementation, Conciliation or bipartism without authoritative implementation.
- Non-interference of the state (Uncoordinated bargaining and state-free coordination by associations). No sub-category.

Operationalization: Description (direct quotation)

Time Period/Year: 1970-1973, 1974-1976, 1977-1979, 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1993, 1994-1996 and 1997-1998

Sources: Traxler et al. (2001:177): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

### **4.3 Public Welfare Schemes**

#### **4.3.1 Introduction of Compulsory Social Insurances**

##### **4.3.1.1 Compulsory Pension Insurance**

Definition: Year of introduction of compulsory pension insurance. The year of introduction of subsidized voluntary insurance (or workmen's compensation or means-tested pensions) are noted in the section for *Comments*.

Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 454): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.3.1.2 Compulsory Health Insurance**

Definition: Year of introduction of compulsory health insurance. The year of introduction of subsidized voluntary insurance (or workmen's compensation or means-tested pensions) are noted in the section for *Comments*.

Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 454): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Leimgruber (2008: 5, Table 0.1): CH

Footnotes:

#### **4.3.1.3 Compulsory Occupational Injuries Insurance**

Definition: Year of introduction of compulsory occupational injuries insurance. The year of introduction of subsidized voluntary insurance (or workmen's compensation or means-tested pensions) are noted in the section for *Comments*.

Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 454): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.3.1.4 Compulsory Unemployment Insurance**

Definition: Year of introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance. The year of introduction of subsidized voluntary insurance (or workmen's compensation or means-tested pensions) are noted in the section for *Comments*.

Operationalization: Year  
Time Period/Year: Year of introduction  
Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 454): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **4.3.2 Financing Social Security**

#### **4.3.2.1 Public Authorities' Role in Financing Social Security**

Definition: Contributions by public authorities as percentage of total receipts in financing social security from 1949 to 1974.

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1949-1974  
Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 459): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

#### **4.3.2.2 Employers' Role in Financing Social Security**

Definition: Contributions by employers as percentage of total receipts in financing social security.

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1949-1974  
Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 459): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **4.3.3 Social Insurance Coverage Rates**

#### **4.3.3.1 Pension Insurance**

Definition: Percentage of the active members of pension insurance as a percentage of the labor force. National insurance scheme coverage is generally estimated at 100 per cent; for international comparisons ratios exceeding 100 percent are excluded. (Active members as percentage of the labor force.)



Operationalization: Percentage  
 Time Period/Year: Time series in five-year intervals: 1880-1975  
 Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 460): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: AT: 1915: based on 1911 data. 1920: based on 1925 data.  
 BE: Data for 1915, 1920 and 1925: constant coverage assumed since 1908. 1940: based on 1946 data, reflecting constant coverage since 1935.  
 DK: 1925 and 1930: Invalidity insurance only.  
 FR: 1900: Based on 1906 data. 1930: Based on 1933 data, new scheme in effect from 1930.  
 IE: 1940-1960: Survivors' insurance only.  
 IT: 1910 and 1915: Based on 1907 data. 1920 and 1925: Coverage under the 1919-scheme based on 1930 data. 1946: Assumption of constant coverage.

#### 4.3.3.2 Health Insurance

Definition: Percentage of the active members of medical benefits insurance as a percentage of the labor force. Coverage rated exceeding 100 percent of the labor force in subsidized voluntary and national health insurance schemes are excluded. For international comparisons the coverage of national insurance schemes is estimated at 100 percent. (Active members as percentage of the labor force.)

Operationalization: Percentage  
 Time Period/Year: Time series in five-year intervals: 1880-1975  
 Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 460): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: IE: Only cash benefit scheme.  
 IT: 1890-1920: Estimate.  
 NL: 1930-1940: Only cash benefit scheme.  
 CH: 1930-1940: Only medical benefit scheme.

#### 4.3.3.3 Occupational Injuries Insurance

Definition: Percentage of the members of occupational injuries insurance as a percentage of the labor force. (Members as percentage of the labor force.)

Operationalization: Percentage  
 Time Period/Year: Time series in five-year intervals: 1880-1975  
 Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 461): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: BE: 1915: Based on 1910 and 1922 data. 1925: Based on 1922 and 1931 data. 1965: Based on 1964 data.  
 DK: 1900-1915: Based on legislative regulations.  
 FR: 1910-1920: Based on 1905 data and on legislative extension of 1906. 1925: Based on 1922 and 1930 data. 1940 and 1945: Constant average assumed since 1930. 1950: Based on 1960 data.  
 DE: Post-1950 data replaced by estimates by Flora et al. (1983) because not corresponding to the institutional information and presumably including double-counts.  
 IE: 1925-1965: Based on legislative information.  
 IT: 1900: Based on 1901 data. 1915: Based on 1911 data. 1920-1930 and 1940-1945: Extension to agriculture constant coverage ratios assumed.  
 NL: 1945: Based on 1940 and 1943 data.  
 C: 1885 and 1905-1915: Inter- and extrapolations from data for 1888-1918. 1970 and 1975: Constant average assumed since 1967.

#### 4.3.3.4 Unemployment Insurance

Definition: Percentage of the members of pension insurance as a percentage of the labor force. (Members as percentage of the labor force.)

Operationalization: Percentage  
 Time Period/Year: Time series in five-year intervals: 1880-1975  
 Sources: Flora et al. (1983: 461): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
 Footnotes: AT: 1920-1925: Based on 1928 data.  
 FI: 1940: Extrapolation of 1933-1936 data.  
 FR: 1935-1940: Only assistance scheme.

IT: 1925: Interpolation of 1920 and 1930 ratios. 1935: Interpolation of 1933 and 1939 ratios.

NL: 1945-1950: Constant average assumed since 1940.

NO: 1940: Based on 1946 data.

#### **4.3.4 Percentage of Public Insurance Expenditures of Total Public Expenditure**

##### **4.3.4.1 Total Public Social Expenditure**

**Definition:** Public social expenditure as percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions). The OECD defines social expenditures as: "The provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract or transfer." (OECD 2007: 6).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

**Sources:** OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

##### **4.3.4.2 Old Age**

**Definition:** Percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions) for old age. The OECD defines old age as: "all cash expenditures (including lump-sum payments) on old-age pensions. Old-age cash benefits provide an income for persons retired from the labour market or guarantee incomes when a person has reached a 'standard' pensionable age or fulfilled the necessary contributory requirements. This category also includes early retirement pensions: pensions paid before the beneficiary has reached the 'standard' pensionable age relevant to the programme. Excluded are programmes concerning early retirement for labour market reasons which are classified under unemployment. Old-age includes supplements for dependants paid to old-age pensioners with dependants under old-age cash benefits. Old age also includes social expenditure on services for the elderly people, services such as day care and rehabilitation services, home-help services and other benefits in kind. It also includes expenditure on the provision of residential care in an institution (for example, the cost of operating homes for the elderly)." (OECD 2007: 13).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

**Sources:** OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

##### **4.3.4.3 Health Insurance**

**Definition:** Percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions) for health insurance. The OECD defines health insurance (health) as: "All public expenditure on health is included (not total health expenditure): current expenditure on health (personal and collective services) and investment. Expenditure in this category encompasses, among other things, expenditure on in-patient care, ambulatory medical services and pharmaceutical goods. Individual health expenditure, insofar as it is not reimbursed by a public institution, is not included. As already noted, cash benefits related to sickness are recorded under sickness benefits. Voluntary private social health expenditure are estimates on the benefits to recipients that derive from private health plans which contain an element of redistribution (such private health insurance plan are often employment-based and/or tax-advantaged)." (OECD 2007: 14).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

**Sources:** OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### **4.3.4.4 Occupational Injury Insurance**

**Definition:** Percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions) for occupational injury insurance. The OECD defines occupational injury insurance (incapacity-related benefits) as: “disability cash benefits comprise of cash payments on account of complete or partial inability to participate gainfully in the labour market due to disability. The disability may be congenital, or the result of an accident or illness during the victim’s lifetime. Spending on Occupational injury and disease records all cash payments such as paid sick leave, special allowances and disability related payments such as pensions, if they are related to prescribed occupational injuries and diseases. Sickness cash benefits related to loss of earning because of the temporary inability to work due to illness are also recorded. This excludes paid leave related to sickness or injury of a dependent child which is recorded under family cash benefits. All expenditure regarding the public provision of health care is recorded under health. Social expenditure on services for the disabled people encompasses services such as day care and rehabilitation services, home-help services and other benefits in kind.” (OECD 2007: 13).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

**Sources:** OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### **4.3.4.5 Unemployment Benefits**

**Definition:** Percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions) for unemployment benefits. The OECD defines unemployment benefits (unemployment) as: “all cash expenditure to people compensating for unemployment. This includes redundancy payments out of public resources as well as pensions to beneficiaries before they reach the 'standard' pensionable age if these payments are made because they are out of work or otherwise for reasons of labour market policy.” (OECD 2007: 15).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

**Sources:** OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### **4.3.4.6 Family Policy**

**Definition:** Percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions) for family policy. The OECD defines family policy (family) as: “expenditure which supports families (i.e. excluding one-person households). This expenditure is often related to the costs associated with raising children or with the support of other dependants. Expenditure related to maternity and parental leave is grouped under the family cash benefits sub-category.” (OECD 2007: 14).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

**Sources:** OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

**Footnotes:**

#### **4.3.4.7 Social Assistance**

**Definition:** Percentage of total general government expenditures (at current prices in national currency, in millions) for social assistance. The OECD defines social assistance (other social policy areas) as: “social expenditure (both in cash and in kind) for those people who for various reasons fall outside the scope of the relevant programme covering a particular contingency, or if this other benefit is insufficient to meet their needs. Social expenditure related to immigrants/refugees and indigenous people are separately recorded in this category. Finally, any social expenditure which is not attributable to other categories is included in the sub-category other.” (OECD 2007: 15).

**Operationalization:** Percentage

**Time Period/Year:** Time series: 1980-2003

Sources: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **4.3.5 Percentage of Public Insurance Expenditures of GDP**

#### **4.3.5.1 Total Public Social Expenditures**

Definition: Total public social expenditures as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions). "The OECD defines social expenditures as: The provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract or transfer." (OECD 2007: 6).

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: Time series: 1980-2003

Sources: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### **4.3.5.2 Old Age**

Definition: Public expenditures for old age as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions). Pension benefits as percentage of gross domestic product (Flora et al. 1983: 457). The OECD defines old age as: "all cash expenditures (including lump-sum payments) on old-age pensions. Old-age cash benefits provide an income for persons retired from the labour market or guarantee incomes when a person has reached a 'standard' pensionable age or fulfilled the necessary contributory requirements. This category also includes early retirement pensions: pensions paid before the beneficiary has reached the 'standard' pensionable age relevant to the programme. Excluded are programmes concerning early retirement for labour market reasons which are classified under unemployment. Old-age includes supplements for dependants paid to old-age pensioners with dependants under old-age cash benefits. Old age also includes social expenditure on services for the elderly people, services such as day care and rehabilitation services, home-help services and other benefits in kind. It also includes expenditure on the provision of residential care in an institution (for example, the cost of operating homes for the elderly)." (OECD 2007b: 13).

Operationalization: Percentage

Time Period/Year: Time series: 1949-1974 and 1980-2003

Sources: 1949-1974: Flora et al. (1983: 457) AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.

1980-2003: OECD 1980-2003: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes: DK: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year.

IE: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year.

#### **4.3.5.3 Health Insurance**

Definition: Public expenditures for health insurance as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions). Health benefits as percentage of gross domestic product (Flora et al. 1983: 457). The OECD defines health insurance (health) as: "All public expenditure on health is included (not total health expenditure): current expenditure on health (personal and collective services and investment). Expenditure in this category encompasses, among other things, expenditure on in-patient care, ambulatory medical services and pharmaceutical goods. Individual health expenditure, insofar as it is not reimbursed by a public institution, is not included. As already noted, cash benefits related to sickness are recorded under sickness benefits. Voluntary private social health expenditure are estimates on the benefits to recipients that derive from private health plans which contain an element of redistribution (such

private health insurance plan are often employment-based and/or tax-advantaged).” (OECD 2007: 14).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1949-1974 and 1980-2003  
Sources: 1949-1974: Flora et al. (1983: 457) AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
1980-2003: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: DK: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year. 1949-1974: Health insurance and public health.  
IE: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year. 1949-1974: Health insurance and public health.

#### 4.3.5.4 Occupational Injury Insurance

Definition: Public expenditures for occupational injury insurance as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions). The OECD defines occupational injury insurance (incapacity-related benefits) as: “disability cash benefits comprise of cash payments on account of complete or partial inability to participate gainfully in the labour market due to disability. The disability may be congenital, or the result of an accident or illness during the victim’s lifetime. Spending on Occupational injury and disease records all cash payments such as paid sick leave, special allowances and disability related payments such as pensions, if they are related to prescribed occupational injuries and diseases. Sickness cash benefits related to loss of earning because of the temporary inability to work due to illness are also recorded. This excludes paid leave related to sickness or injury of a dependent child which is recorded under family cash benefits. All expenditure regarding the public provision of health care is recorded under health. Social expenditure on services for the disabled people encompasses services such as day care and rehabilitation services, home-help services and other benefits in kind.” (OECD 2007: 13).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1980-2003  
Sources: 1980-2003: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.

Footnotes:

#### 4.3.5.5 Unemployment Benefits

Definition: Public expenditures for unemployment benefits as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions).  
Unemployment benefits as percentage of gross domestic product (Flora et al. 1983: 458). The OECD defines unemployment benefits (unemployment) as: “all cash expenditure to people compensating for unemployment. This includes redundancy payments out of public resources as well as pensions to beneficiaries before they reach the 'standard' pensionable age if these payments are made because they are out of work or otherwise for reasons of labour market policy.” (OECD 2007: 15).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1949-1974 and 1980-2003  
Sources: 1949-1974: Flora et al. (1983: 458) AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
1980-2003: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: DK: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year.  
IE: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year.

#### 4.3.5.6 Family Policy

Definition: Public expenditures for family policy as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions). Family allowances as percentage of gross domestic product (Flora et al. 1983: 458). The OECD defines family policy (family

as: “expenditure which supports families (i.e. excluding one-person households). This expenditure is often related to the costs associated with raising children or with the support of other dependants. Expenditure related to maternity and parental leave is grouped under the family cash benefits sub-category.” (OECD 2007: 14).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1949-1974 and 1980-2003  
Sources: 1949-1974: Flora et al. (1983: 458) AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH.  
1980-2003: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes: DK: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year.  
IE: Data which refers to financial years (April 1 – March 31) are expressed as percentages of GDP of the previous year.  
CH: The Swiss figures refer to federal schemes only.

#### **4.3.5.7 Social Assistance**

Definition: Public expenditures for social assistance as percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product at current prices in national currency, in millions). The OECD defines social assistance (other social policy areas) as: “social expenditure (both in cash and in kind) for those people who for various reasons fall outside the scope of the relevant programme covering a particular contingency, or if this other benefit is insufficient to meet their needs. Social expenditure related to immigrants/refugees and indigenous people are separately recorded in this category. Finally, any social expenditure which is not attributable to other categories is included in the sub-category other.” (OECD 2007: 15).

Operationalization: Percentage  
Time Period/Year: Time series: 1980-2003  
Sources: OECD (2007a): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH.  
Footnotes:

### **4.3.6 Welfare State Typologies**

#### **4.3.6.1 Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism**

Definition: This classification of the three worlds of welfare capitalism consists of a welfare state being liberal, conservative or social democratic. Esping-Anderson (1990: 26-28) defines the liberal welfare state as being characterized by means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance; the conservative welfare state as being characterized by corporatism, the preservation of status differentials, the state as the provider of welfare, and as being strongly committed to the preservation of traditional family-hood; and the social democratic welfare state as being characterized by the principles of universalism and de-commodification, equality of the highest standards, the fusion of welfare and work, and preemptive socialization of the costs of family-hood.

Categories:  
-Liberal  
-Conservative  
-Social Democratic  
-Mixed Type

Operationalization: Classification  
Time Period/Year: Please note that no time period/year is provided by the authors of the sources.  
Sources: Esping-Andersen (1990: 26-27): AT, DK, FI, FR, DE, IT, NO, SE.  
Siegel (2007: 267): BE, IE, NL, CH.

Footnotes:

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