

Winter Term 2016/17

Dr. Jan Sauermann

(14335.0034) Collective Action

PO 2015: Basismodul Seminar Politikwissenschaft I (9 Leistungspunkte)

PO 2007/08: Hauptseminar Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft (6 Leistungspunkte)

Time: Mondays 10:00 – 11:30

Room: Gottfried-Keller-Str. 6, Hörsaal des Forschungsinstituts

First Session: 17 October 2016

Course description

At the heart of many societal problems ranging from the international level to interpersonal relations lies a social dilemma. In such a situation, conflict arises because individual and collective interests collide. In a typical social dilemma, mutual cooperation among all involved actors leads to an efficient collective outcome. Yet, every actor has an incentive to defect and free-ride on the other actors' cooperation, and if all actors follow their narrow self-interest, the community will end up in an inefficient state.

In this seminar, we will identify and discuss factors influencing the level of cooperation among actors in a large variety of different social dilemma situations. In doing so, we will take an interdisciplinary approach encompassing theories and methods from political science, sociology, economics, and social psychology.

Prerequisites

Students should have a good knowledge of political science concepts, basic qualitative and quantitative methods, and an interest in current research. Since nearly all reading assignments are in English, this will be the general classroom language as well. Participants therefore must know enough English to be able to participate actively. Perfection is not required – you just need to understand and make yourself understood.

Relevance for study programmes

The course is open to all **master students** of the WiSo-Faculty with an interest in political science.

Registration

The course will be taught on a weekly basis (first session October 17). Students should register via KLIPS.

Reading assignments

All required texts for the sessions of the seminar can be found on [LIAS](#).

Most texts can only be accessed from within the UKLAN network of the University of Cologne. If you do not know how to obtain access to UKLAN, please consult the RRZK's websites: <http://rrzk.uni-koeln.de/netzzugang.html?&L=1>

Working requirements and assessment method

All participants are expected to:

- attend the seminar on a regular basis
- complete assigned readings according to schedule
- actively contribute to class discussions
- give a 10 to 15 minutes presentation in the seminar
- write a research paper of 15-20 pages in length
 - PO 2015: about 6.000 words
 - PO 2007/08: about 5000 words

Submission of the research paper

Please hand in two versions of your research paper:

- **Electronic version**
(pdf- or Word file) via email to jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de
Deadline: 20 March 2017, 10:00am
- **Paper version**
You can hand in the paper version personally at the secretary of the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (*IBW Gebäude, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, 1st floor, Room 1.09*) or send it by mail to:
Jan Sauermann, Universität zu Köln, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics,
Postfach 411020, 50870 Köln

The paper version must contain the following signed statement:

http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf

Teilnahme- und Prüfungsbedingungen

- Regelmäßige Teilnahme an den Seminarsitzungen
- Gründliche Vorbereitung der angegebenen Grundlagenliteratur
- Aktive Beteiligung an den Diskussionen im Seminar
- Referat (10-15 Minuten)
- Hausarbeit von 15-20 Seiten
 - PO 2015: ca. 6.000 Wörter
 - PO 2007/08: ca. 5000 Wörter

Abgabe der Hausarbeit

Bitte reichen Sie zwei Versionen Ihrer Hausarbeit ein:

- **Elektronische Version**
(pdf- oder Word-Dokument) per Email an jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de
Deadline: 20. März 2017, 10:00 Uhr
- **Papierversion**
Sie können die ausgedruckte Version Ihrer Hausarbeit entweder persönlich während der Öffnungszeiten im Sekretariat des Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (IBW-Gebäude, Herbert-Lewin-Str.2, 1. Stock, Raum 1.09) abgeben oder per Post an folgende Adresse senden:
Jan Sauermann, Universität zu Köln, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics,
Postfach 411020, 50870 Köln

Die Papierversion muss folgende unterschriebene Erklärung beinhalten:

http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf

General readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Hardin, Russell. 1982. *Collective Action*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schedule

1) 17 October 2016 – Introduction

2) 24 October 2016 – The logic of collective action

Required readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1-65.

3) 31 October 2016 – The tragedy of the commons

Required readings:

- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons." *Science* 162 (3859): 1243-48.
- Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom. 1977. "Public Goods and Public Choices." In *Alternatives for Delivering Public Services. Toward Improved Performance*, ed. E. S. Savas. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 7-49.

4) 7 November 2016 – Voluntary cooperation in repeated interactions

Required readings:

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 3-69.

Oral presentation:

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 73-87.

5) 14 November 2016 – Rational choice explanations of collective action: Self-interest, trust, and reciprocity

Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 1-22.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1999. "Contending Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11 (2):171-202.

6) 21 November 2016 – Experimental evidence on behavior in social dilemma games

Required readings:

- Isaac, Mark R., and James M. Walker. 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 103 (1): 179-99.
- McDermott, Rose. 2002. "Experimental Methods in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (1): 31-61. **Concentrate on pp. 31-41!**

7) 28 November 2016 – Communication and reputation

Required readings:

- Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok, and Axel Ockenfels. 2004. "How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation " *Management Science* 50 (11): 1587-602.
- Brosig, Jeannette, Axel Ockenfels, and Joachim Weimann. 2003. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation." *German Economic Review* 4 (2): 217-41.

8) 5 December 2016 – Sanctioning

Required readings:

- Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments." *American Economic Review* 90 (4): 980-94.
- Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible." *American Political Science Review* 86 (2): 404-17.

9) 12 December 2016 – Are groups more egoistic than individuals?

Required readings:

- Sauer mann, Jan, and Ulrich Glassmann. 2014. "Restraining Free-Riders: The Effects of Actor Types and Decision Rules in the Public Goods Game." *Rationality and Society* 26 (3): 290-319.
- Gillet, Joris, Arthur J.H.C. Schram, and Joep Sonnemans. 2009. "The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited: The Importance of Group Decision-Making." *Journal of Public Economics* 93 (5-6): 785-97.

10) 19 December 2016 – Identity

Required readings:

- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709-25.
- Whitt, Sam, and Rick K. Wilson. 2007. "The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (3):655-68.

11) 9 January 2017 – Governing the commons

Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems." *American Economic Review* 100 (3): 641-72.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 58-102.

12) 16 January 2017 – Institutional change

Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor, and Xavier Basurto. 2011. "Crafting Analytical Tools to Study Institutional Change." *Journal of Institutional Economics* 7 (3): 317-43.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 103-142.

13) 23 January 2017 – The voters' paradox: Explaining turnout in mass elections

Required readings:

- Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review* 62 (1): 25-42. (Concentrate on pp. 25-28)
- Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.
- Fowler, James H. 2006. "Altruism and Turnout." *Journal of Politics* 68 (3): 674-83.

14) 30 January 2017 – Explaining revolutions

Required readings:

- Lichbach, Mark I. 1994. "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?: Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action." *World Politics* 46 (3): 383-418.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational?: Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action." *Rationality and Society* 6 (1): 139-66.

15) 6 February 2017 – Final discussion & presentation of research projects

Task for this session:

Hand in a one-page outline of your planned research design by Thursday, 2 February 2017, 10:00 AM.